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Article
(Re)forming the Jury:
Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias
ANNA ROBERTS
This Article investigates whether one of the most intractable problems in trial procedure can be
ameliorated through the use of one of the most striking discoveries in recent social science. The
intractable problem is selecting a fair jury. Current doctrine fails to address the fact that jurors
harbor not only explicit, or conscious, bias, but also implicit, or unconscious, bias. The discovery is
the Implicit Association Test ("IA T"), an online test that aims to reveal implicit bias.
This Article conducts the first comparison ofproposals that the IAT be used to address jury bias.
They fall into two groups. The first group would use the IAT to "screen" potential jurors for implicit
bias; the second group would use the IAT to educate jurors about implicit bias, These proposals merit
deeper consideration. Implicit bias is pervasive, and affects crucial juror functions: evaluation of
evidence, recall offacts, and judgment of guilt. Juries are generally told nothing about implicit bias.
The judiciary has expressed concern about implicit juror bias, and sought help from the academy in
addressing the problem.
This Article provides what these two groups of proposals lack: critique and context. It shows that
using the IA T to screen jurors is misguided. However, the Article contends that the educational project
has merit because implicit bias can be countered through knowledge of its existence and motivation to
address it. To refine the project, this Article identifies two vital issues that distinguish the proposals:
when jurors should learn about implicit bias, and how they should learn about it.
On the issue of when, this Article argues that the education should begin while the jurors are still
being oriented. Orientation is not only universal, but, as research into "priming" and 'framing"
suggests, a crucial period for the forming offirst impressions. On the issue of how, this Article argues
that those proposals that would include the jurors taking an 1AT are superior to those that would
simply instruct jurors on what the IA T shows. In an area fraught with denial, mere instruction would
likely be dismissed as irrelevant. This Article uses pedagogical theory to show that experiential
learning about bias is more likely to be effective.
Finally, this Article brings when and how together, proposing a model that would include the use
of the IAT as an experiential learning tool during orientation. This model would harness the civic
energy of jurors to an educational purpose, rather than letting it morph into boredom; by putting
jurors in an active mindset, it would enhance their satisfaction with the process, and their ability to
perform optimally. As for potential jurors who are never selected, their participation would honor the
long-standing educational function ofjury service.
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(Re)forming the Jury:
Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias
ANNA ROBERTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article investigates whether one of the most intractable problems
in trial procedure can be ameliorated through the use of one of the most
striking discoveries in recent social science. The intractable problem is the
challenge of creating a fair process for the selection of fair jurors. Current
doctrine fails to address the fact that jurors harbor not only explicit, or
conscious bias, but also implicit, or unconscious, bias.1 Among other
problems, the presence and strength of individual bias can be extremely
difficult to detect. The striking discovery is the Implicit Association Test
("IAT"), an online test that, through measuring response times to certain
words and images, aims to reveal the presence and strength of the test
taker's implicit bias.2 The [AT offers the possibility that bias could be
detected, and perhaps lessened, within the jury.
This Article conducts the first comparison of the recent rash of
proposals relating to the use of the IAT to address jury bias. These
proposals fall into two groups. The first group would use the IAT to
"screen" potential jurors, so that those with the strongest bias could be
removed; the second group would use the IAT as a means of educating
jurors about implicit bias. These proposals, most of which have been
merely sketched out, merit deeper consideration. It is clear that implicit
. Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. Thanks for their generous and
enthusiastic help to Katharine Bartlett, Adam Benforado, The Honorable Mark Bennett, Gary Blasi,
Paulette Caldwell, Peggy Cooper Davis, Bryan Fair, Joe Feagin, James Forman, John Gastil, Phillip
Atiba Goff, Alexander Green, Susan Herman, Maureen Howard, K. Babe Howell, Jim Jacobs, Brian
Kalt, Cynthia Lee, Mona Lynch, Perry Moriearty, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Antony Page, Natalie
Pedersen, JJ Prescott, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Karena Rahall, Candis Roberts, Kathryn Sabbeth, Reggie
Shuford, Dean Spade, Steve Smith, Geoff Ward, Marvin Zalman, my co-panelists and audience at the
Law & Society Conference session at which a draft of this Article was presented, and the participants
in the NYU School of Law Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium at which a draft was presented. I am
grateful to the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their openness, and improvements, to this
Article. Kevin Frick, Tracy Huang, Max Kaplan, and Kevin Terry provided excellent research
assistance, and I thank them for it.
1 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1195, 1196-97 (2009) ("Two potential sources of disparate treatment in court are
explicit bias and implicit bias.").
2 See John Tiemey, In Bias Test, Shades of Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at Dl (noting that
the IAT measures reaction times as test-takers associate words with whites and blacks).
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bias is pervasive, and that it affects the most important functions of jurors:
evaluation of witnesses and evidence, evaluation of behavior, recall of
facts, and judgment of guilt.3 Juries are generally told nothing about
implicit bias, however, despite the constitutional requirement that they be
fair and impartial.4  Meanwhile, members of the judiciary have expressed
their concern about implicit juror bias;5 one has called out to the academy
for help with this problem, 6 while another has proceeded to devise his own
solutions.7
While the proposals are important, insufficient attention has been
devoted to their disadvantages. In addition, by failing to consider the
contexts wherein they would be implemented-for example, current
practices and best practices in juror education-they have failed to
maximize their potential advantages. Drawing on the social science
relating to implicit bias and on pedagogical theory, this Article provides
critique and context. It demonstrates that screening jurors on the basis of
their IAT scores brings risks that outweigh the advantages. Specifically, it
fails to address the fact that bias is complex, and accusations of bias
freighted. The proposals that the IAT be used as an educational resource
have more potential. Social science supports the idea that implicit bias can
be countered through knowledge of its existence and motivation to address
it.8 In order to refine the educational project, this Article identifies the two
crucial issues that distinguish the various proposals: the issue of when
jurors should be taught about implicit bias, and how they should be taught.
On the issue of when jurors should be introduced to this material, this
Article argues that those proposals that would begin the education during
juror orientation hold more potential than those that would begin only once
jurors are sent to specific courtrooms. This Article critiques the failure of
3 See Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 600-
01 (2009) (noting that Americans have biases that manifest themselves when they "categorize
information, remember facts, and make decisions").
4 Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 1030-
31 (2008).
'See id. at 1029; Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 150 (2010); see also Michael B. Hyman, What the Blindfold
Hides, 48 JUDGES' J. 32, 33 (2009).
6 See Arterton, supra note 4, at 1029 ("[B]eing aware of the potential for jurors to bring
unacknowledged biases to the deliberative process, how can and should judges react?").
7 Bennett, supra note 5, at 169.
8 See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276 (2002) ("To the extent that there is good news in the current
science about stereotypes, it is that while we may be unable to do much about their automatic
activation, we can nevertheless behave in substantially nonprejudiced ways if we are so motivated.");
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1555 (2004) ("There is some evidence that awareness of automatic reactions
can trigger attempts to counteract them, and that such attempts are sometimes successful.").
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scholars, administrators, and advocates to scrutinize the content of juror
orientation, especially given what has been learned from research on
"priming" and "framing" about the importance of first impressions. 9 It
shows, for example, that while juror orientation programs are haphazard,
one constant is the failure to provide jurors with any information about
implicit bias. This Article highlights the particular advantage of the
universality of orientation: waiting until jurors are in a particular
courtroom allows judicial rulings, inadequate attorney resources, or fear of
appearing to "play the race card," to prevent this education.
On the issue of how jurors should be educated about implicit bias, this
Article highlights a distinction that these proposals downplay. It argues
that the proposals that would involve the jurors actually taking an IAT, and
getting their results, are superior to those that would simply instruct jurors
on what the IAT reveals about implicit bias. In an area that is as fraught
with denial as racial bias, there is a real possibility that an instruction on
this topic would be dismissed as inapplicable. The IAT, by contrast,
allows test takers physically to experience their bias. Drawing on
pedagogical theory, this Article argues that it is this type of active,
experiential leaming that is most valuable in the area of implicit bias.
This Article then brings the questions of when and how together,
proposing the use of the IAT as a means of experiential learning during
juror orientation. The Article shows that the IAT's usefulness as a means
of raising awareness about implicit bias has been demonstrated in research
conducted with doctors, and it gives additional reasons why the use of such
a program with jurors would have particular advantages. It would capture
the civic energy that potential jurors bring to the courthouse, and harness it
to an educational purpose, rather than letting it morph into boredom and
resentment. By putting jurors in an active mindset from the earliest
opportunity, it would enhance their satisfaction with, and investment in,
the judicial process, and their ability to function optimally. Bringing social
science and pedagogical theory together, this Article suggests that juror
orientation materials should maintain their focus on egalitarian norms:
these have been shown to aid in combating implicit bias.'0 They should be
modified, however, to include information about implicit bias, and to
encourage potential jurors to take an IAT. The conversation begun in
orientation could then usefully be continued in the courtroom. As for the
majority of potential jurors-who never reach a courtroom-their
participation in a public education project would be consistent with the
9 See ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 56-57 (7th ed. 2010) (priming); GORDON
B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS 33-34 (2005) (framing).
10 John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of
Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager
Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 56 (2009).
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long-standing educational function of jury service, and might help to
justify the time spent at the courthouse.
Part II lays out the intractable problem of bias in juries and jury
selection. It introduces the concepts of implicit and explicit bias, and
discusses how they affect jurors, as well as judges and attorneys. It
critiques as inadequate the existing doctrine relating to such bias. Part III
introduces the IAT, and examines its first appearances in the courtroom.
Part IV examines proposals that have been made to use the IAT as a means
of screening potential jurors. While these proposals attempt to address
many of the types of bias described in Part II, Part IV concludes that their
advantages are outweighed by their disadvantages.
Part V turns to the proposals to use the IAT to educate jurors. It
concludes that these have more merit as a means of addressing the
problems outlined in Part II. Part V compares the proposals along the two
most salient axes, looking at when the jurors would be taught, and how
they would be taught. A lack of attention to two areas of opportunity
appears-the opportunity effectively to prepare jurors during their
orientation for what they should expect and how they should perform their
task, and the opportunity to engage jurors through experiential modes of
learning rather than purely passive instruction. Part V suggests that the use
of the IAT as an educational tool administered during jury orientation
could exploit both of these opportunities, and proposes a format for further
investigation.
Part VI discusses three possible objections to this proposal. This Part
concludes that while none of them creates an insuperable bar to its
implementation, efforts to tackle implicit bias through jury education are
no substitute for, and must be combined with, continued efforts to diversify
juries.
II. THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEM
The intractable problem with which this Article is concerned is the
challenge of devising a system for the fair selection of fair jurors, given the
continuing presence of bias. This Article will focus on racial bias, a type
of bias to which a great deal of research has been devoted. 1 This Part
introduces the two main categories of racial bias inherent in juries and jury
selection: implicit bias and explicit bias, categories now discussed more
frequently than "unconscious discrimination" and "conscious
11 See Samuel Sommers & Phoebe Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice
Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 202 (2001)
("As the review of psychological research demonstrates, in psychology there is a substantial body of
theory and research on prejudice against minority groups and on White Americans' racial bias against
Black Americans in particular.").
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discrimination."' 12  Under each heading, the concept and its role in the
selection and the decision-making of juries are explained, and the
protections that are currently set up against the phenomenon are described.
This Part concludes that these protections are failing to address the
problems identified.
A. Implicit Bias
"Implicit biases" are discriminatory biases based on either implicit
attitudes-feelings that one has about a particular group-or implicit
stereotypes-traits that one associates with a particular group.13 They are
so subtle that those who hold them may not realize that they do. 14 Implicit
bias operates in areas such as gender, nationality, and social status, 5 but
strong levels of implicit racial bias relating to African-Americans have
drawn the most attention. African-Americans, for example, are
stereotypically linked to crime and violence; 6 their behavior is more likely
to be viewed as violent, hostile, and aggressive than is the behavior of
whites; 7 and they are more readily associated with weapons than are
whites.1
8
12 See David C. Baldus et al., Evidence of Racial Discrimination in the Use of the Death Penalty:
A Story from Southwest Arkansas (1990-2005) with Special Reference to the Case of Death Row
Inmate Frank Williams, Jr., 76 TENN. L. REV. 555, 566 n.26 (2009) ("The distinction between
Iconscious' and 'unconscious' racial prejudice . . . has evolved in recent years into a distinction
between 'explicit' and 'implicit' bias."). But see Transcript of Motion: Evidentiary Hearing at 477,
New Hampshire v. Addison, No. 07-S-0254, 2008 WL 2675622 (N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2008)
[hereinafter Banaji Testimony] (Mahzarin Banaji announcing intention to use "implicit bias" and
"unconscious prejudice" interchangeably).
13 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 948-51 (2006).
14 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995); see also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., A
Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 3
(2002).
is Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 13, at 951.
16 Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR. L.
REv. 1, 40 (2010); Mona Lynch, Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Life-and-Death Decision Making, in
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 182, 188
(Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) ("[T]he stereotype of African-Americans as violent
and criminally inclined is... strong and influential, particularly among Whites.").
17 Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 406 (1996) (discussing the fact that interpretations of
ambiguous acts can be affected by the race of the actor, and citing studies that "suggest that stereotypes
about Blacks as violent or dangerous people influence perception and judgment").
18 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493 (2005) (noting that
these associations are held by both Blacks and Whites). Other examples of implicit bias operating
against members of one's own "group" include women joining men in implicit gender stereotypes that
are sometimes negative toward women and people over sixty joining those in their twenties in implicit
preference for young over old. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 361 (2007).
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Levels of implicit bias frequently conflict with self-reported attitudes, 19
usually because explicit measures show no bias, while implicit measures
show bias.20 Because of this disconnect, implicit bias is sometimes offered
as a partial explanation of the continuation of racial stratification even
while, as measured by surveys, openly held racial stereotypes and
prejudice have declined substantially over the last fifty years.2'
"Seek, and ye shall find" has been the theme of implicit bias research.
Implicit bias has been shown to be widespread among the general public, 22
and to influence behavior by professionals and laypeople in contexts that
include employment, medicine, voting, and law enforcement;23 it has also
been detected in juvenile and criminal justice authorities.24  Paul Butler
claims that implicit bias may have lurked beneath the robe of Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
25
Implicit bias can affect various types of behaviors. These include snap
26judgments, such as whether to fire a gun, 6 but also "positions arrived at
after careful consideration such as the policy choices of legislators,
policemen, and employers. 27  Other mental activities that are affected
include perception, forming of impressions, processing of information, use
of information, and retrieval of information. 8 Implicit bias is thus both
"pervasive" and "deep. 29
There is some indication that the fact, or at least the effects, of implicit
'9 Levinson, supra note 3, at 601.
20 Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?:
Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1066 (2009).
21 See Kang, supra note 18, at 1506; Geoff Ward et al., Does Racial Balance in Workforce
Representation Yield Equal Justice? Race Relations of Sentencing in Federal Court Organizations, 43
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 757, 771 (2009).
n Ward et al., supra note 21, at 759.
23 See Jost et al., supra note 10.
24 Ward et al., supra note 21, at 759.
25 Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1035
(2006).
26 See Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials and the Decision to Shoot: The Role of
Threat Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 126 ("Behavioral
data replicated previous findings: participants shot armed Blacks more quickly than armed Whites, and
decided not to shoot unarmed Whites more quickly than unarmed Blacks.").
27 Charles Lawrence IlI, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of
"The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection, " 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 958 (2008).
28 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 600-01 ("These biases manifest automatically and without
conscious awareness in a variety of basic circumstances, such as when people categorize information,
remember facts, and make decisions.").
29 Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in
Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2009); see also Peggy C.
Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1562 (1989) (arguing that a person who reacts
negatively to blacks has "assimilated negative stereotypes about blacks before she reached the age of
judgment. She will, therefore, have accepted them as truth rather than opinion.").
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bias might be combated.3° Implicit associations have been termed
"malleable,"'" and, according to Kristin Lane and other psychologists,
"[c]onscious exertion to be unbiased may-at least temporarily-reduce
implicit bias. 32  Factors that aid this project include awareness of the
bias,33 and motivation for non-biased behavior.34 Pretending that race is
irrelevant does not help.35
1. Implicit Bias in the Courtroom
Implicit bias is no less prevalent in the courtroom than in the street.
Judges harbor implicit bias, 36 as do death penalty attorneys, 37 despite very
different self-characterizations by both groups.38 So, too, do prosecutors.
39
30 For information on overcoming implicit bias, see Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The
Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1367 (2010). For information on combating the effects of
implicit bias, see Gary Blasi, supra note 8, at 1276 ("To the extent that there is good news in the
current science about stereotypes, it is that while we may be unable to do much about their automatic
activation, we can nevertheless behave in substantially nonprejudiced ways if we are so motivated."),
and Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8, at 1555.
31 Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About the JAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
32 Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. Scl. 427, 438
(2007).
33 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 1275 ("Whatever our motivations, none of us can do much about
prejudices of which we are completely unaware.").
34 See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN.
L. REv. 97, 102 n.27 (2010) (quoting Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and
Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117,
133 (1994)) ("There is considerable evidence, then, that forewarning and debiasing manipulations are
most likely to work when . . . [t]hey make people aware of the unwanted processing, they motivate
people to resist it, and people are aware of the direction and magnitude of the bias and have sufficient
control over their responses to correct for it.").
35 Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 471, 477 (2008) ("[P]retending
that race is irrelevant allows unconscious racism to operate without any constraints.").
36 See Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception & Employment
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487,
1517 (1997) ("Of course judges, being human, are prone to the same prejudices as the rest of us. They
too hear stories through a skewed cognitive filter . .
" Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8, at 1553.
38 Compare Hyman, supra note 5, at 32 ("Most judges, if asked, consider themselves free of bias,
even-handed, and open-minded .... "), and Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 1225 (reporting that ninety-
seven percent ofjudges surveyed placed themselves in the top half of their peer group in their ability to
"avoid racial prejudice in decisionmaking," and fifty percent placed themselves in the top quartile),
with Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8, at 1555-56 (reporting that many of the capital defense
attorneys tested for racial preference "were surprised at their own automatic preferences and, therefore,
would not have previously realized that they should struggle against those preferences").
39 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 115 (2010) ("Numerous studies have shown
that prosecutors interpret and respond to identical criminal activity differently based on the race of the
offender."); Levinson, supra note 3, at 617 (citing research indicating that implicit bias among
prosecutors may lead to racial disparities in capital cases, and that unconscious bias may affect
prosecutors even more than others).
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So, too, does the jury,40 despite its characterization by the Supreme Court
as the criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty
against race or color prejudice. 'Al
Judges, as well as scholars, have recognized the existence of implicit
bias in the courtroom. Supreme Court opinions have acknowledged its
42 4presence in jurors, its potential to affect their assessments of evidence,43
and its potential to affect their verdicts.44 Some state and lower federal
courts have followed suit,45 noting that implicit bias among jurors extends
beyond evaluations of a criminal defendant, to other juror tasks such as
evaluation of witnesses.46 Supreme Court Justices, and other judges, have
also acknowledged the possibility of implicit bias in attorneys 47 and in
40 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 623 ("Death qualification may activate jurors' implicit racial
stereotypes by indirectly priming racial constructs."); Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Association
Test": A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395,
419 (2003) ("[T]he unconscious nature of juror bias prevents the voir dire from impaneling fair and
impartial jurors ... ").
41 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
42 See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 42 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is certainly
true, as the Court maintains, that racial bias inclines one to disbelieve and disfavor the object of the
prejudice, and it is similarly incontestable that subconscious, as well as express, racial fears and hatreds
operate to deny fairness to the person despised .... "); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196
(1909).
" Turner, 476 U.S. at 41-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 162 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious
racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their
trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence."); id. at 61 (Thomas, J., concurring);
Turner, 476 U.S. at 35 (White, J., plurality opinion) ("On the facts of this case, a juror who believes
that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in deciding
whether the petitioner's crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law .... More
subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror's decision in this case. Fear of
blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the facts of the petitioner's crime, might incline a juror to
favor the death penalty."); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 509-10 (7th Cir. 2005); People v. Taylor,
229 P.3d 12, 65-66 (Cal. 2010); State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1077-78 (Conn. 1993) ("A juror is
not likely to admit being a prejudiced person . . . and indeed might not recognize the extent to which
unconscious racial stereotypes might affect his or her evaluation of a defendant of a different
race...."); Commonwealth v. McCowen, 939 N.E.2d 735, 767 (Mass. 2010) (Ireland, J., concurring)
("Courts are aware that unconscious racism could affect the outcome of trials."); Commonwealth v.
Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Mass. 1991) (quoting Smith, 455 U.S. at 221-22) ("Determining whether
a juror is biased or has prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the juror may have an interest in
concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.").
4 Tucker, 629 A.2d at 1077-78.
47 See, e.g., Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[N]ot even the
lawyer herself[] can be certain whether a decision to exercise a peremptory challenge rests upon an
impermissible racial ... stereotype."); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267-68 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A prosecutor's
own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black
juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror
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judges.48
Implicit bias in judges and jurors can inhere in unintentional
"misremember[ing]" of facts in racially biased ways,49 during all stages of
legal decision-making.50  Jody Armour has suggested that "habitual
stereotype-congruent responses to blacks, even by sincerely racially liberal
whites, may distort legal judgments concerning blacks as much in
contemporary America as in the America [Clarence] Darrow knew.'
Ronald Tabak has illustrated the extent and seriousness, including
constitutional seriousness, of the potential impacts of implicit bias on
jurors:
* It can affect how jurors react to assertions that
someone acted in self-defense[;]
" It can affect assertions that there was excessive
force by the police[;]
* It can affect whether there really is a presumption
ofinnocence... [;]
* It can affect whether the jury believes that
remaining silent, which is a defendant's
constitutional right, is an admission of guilt[;]
* It can even affect how the jury perceives an expert
witness who is a person of color.
52
had acted identically."); United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring); King v. Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
48 See Clemmons, 892 F.2d at 1162 ("[T]he prosecutor's prejudice may be subtle, unconscious,
and shared by the judge...) (quoting Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472, 1581
(1988)); Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding "sizeable risk that
perceptions and decisions made [in selection of Grand Jury foreman by judge, in consultation with
others] may have been affected by unconscious bias").
49 Levinson, supra note 18, at 347.50 Id.
5t Jody Armour, Stereotypes & Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice
Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 764 (1995); see also id. ("If so, these distorted judgments are more
insidious than before because they result from automatic processes, which often (but not necessarily
always) escape conscious detection."); id. at 747 (adding that "finding a nonracial reason to
discriminate against a black litigant is especially easy to do-one simply gives more weight to the
evidence favoring the opposing litigant").
52 Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, Notwithstanding President
Obama's Election, 37 N. KY. L. REv. 243, 256-57 (2010). Levinson offers support for the idea that
"when it comes to racial equality and the presumption of innocence, there is reason for concern."
Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association
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Strategies for addressing implicit juror bias are discussed below.53 In
the case of addressing implicit judicial bias, there are some promising
signs. Even though the racial imbalance of the justice system may
reinforce the implicit racial bias of judges who work in it every day,54
judges are able to suppress their implicit racial bias when they are both
aware of the need to monitor its influence, and are motivated to do
something about it."
2. Existing Protections Against Implicit Bias in the Courtroom
Despite the threats to impartiality created by implicit bias on the part
of judges, attorneys, and jurors, protections against it and its effects are
few.
Some effort has been made to educate the various courtroom players
about their implicit bias. Judicial trainings on this topic have been
created.5 6 Federal judges, however, are not required to attend any judicial
trainings,57 and most judges remain uninformed on this issue.58 Proposals
have been initiated to educate prosecutors about implicit bias.59  As for
educating jurors about their own implicit biases, one judge has devised his
own solutions.60
Whether or not they receive such education, judges and jurors are
required to be impartial. In the case of federal judges, this is the subject of
Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207 (2010) (discussing study designed by the authors that found,
"[First,] that participants held implicit associations between Black and Guilty. Second, we found that
these implicit associations were meaningful--they predicted judgments of the probative value of
evidence"); see also Lee, supra note 17, at 413 (mentioning the "oft-unstated assumption that blacks
are still on probation" and "are not necessarily granted a presumption of innocence") (quoting ELLIS
COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 72 (1993)).53 See infra Parts IV, V.
54 See Darrell A. H. Miller, lqbal & Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1008 (2010) (reporting that
researchers have speculated that the implicit bias harbored by judges may "result from repeated
exposure to minorities in the justice system").
s5 See Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 1197 ("Judges can, at least in some instances, compensate for
their implicit biases.").56 See Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental Value of
Judicial Ethics: Lessons from "Big Judge Davis," 99 KY. L.J. 259, 308-10 (2010-11) (discussing
several judicial training programs).
57 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal
Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591, 621 (2009).
58 See McKoski, supra note 56, at 306 ("Few judges understand the complicated mental processes
involved in receiving and evaluating information during the decision-making process. Judges are
simply unaware of how heuristics and other subconscious biases and stereotypes influence outcomes.
It is education in these matters, foreign to most judges, that holds the greatest hope for improving
judicial impartiality.").59 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393,448 n.418 (2009).
60 See Bennett, supra note 5, at 169 (discussing the use of a slide about implicit bias in a
PowerPoint presentation shown by the author before voir dire).
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an oath;6 1 in the case of all judges, it is an ethical rule,62 and a matter of
professional identity.63 Implicit bias, however, can impair judges' ability
to align their conduct with what is ethical.64
In the case of jurors, impartiality is a constitutional requirement, 6S and
bias in even one juror violates a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.66
However, procedures for removing biased jurors were established long
61before the existence and significance of implicit bias were widely known.
Motions by attorneys to remove jurors "for cause"--in other words, on the
basis that they cannot be fair-have been viewed as the primary
opportunity for removing biased jurors.68 Such motions, however, are
granted only on the basis of a narrow set of rather obvious biases, 69 and not
on grounds of implicit bias.7° Indeed, despite the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement of the phenomenon,7' courts have typically been hostile
6' 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006) ("Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following
oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: 'I, _, do solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to
the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon
me as __ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God."').
62 Ramirez, supra note 57, at 596 n.21 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2
(2007)).
63 John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The
Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 10 (2010).
64 See id. at 7 ("Judges naturally strive to reach decisions that are both correct on the merits and
correct from an ethical perspective. Implicit biases can potentially impair the ability ofjudges to reach
correct decisions from either perspective.").
65 See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976) ("A criminal defendant in a state court is
guaranteed an 'impartial jury' by the Sixth Amendment as applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Principles of due process also guarantee a defendant an impartial jury.").
66 See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants a verdict by impartial, indifferent jurors. The bias or prejudice of even a single
juror would violate Dyer's right to a fair trial.").
67 See Jay M. Spears, Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise
of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1499 (1975) ("Because this system [of cause and
peremptory challenges] evolved and rigidified long before there was general awareness of the existence
and impact of unconscious bias, it is not surprising that challenges for cause, which are based on
admitted or clearly implied bias, have traditionally been considered the primary tool for eliminating
prejudiced jurors .... ").
68 See Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive
Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 369, 379 (2010).
69 See Benjamin Hoom Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v.
Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 191, 191 n.2 (1995).
70 Id. at 1500 n.3 1. But see State v. Gesch, 482 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Wis. 1992) (finding implied bias
in part because of the potential for unconscious bias); Nancy Lewis Alvarez, Racial Bias and the Right
to an Impartial Jury: A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 959, 961-62 (1982)
("Implied bias, which may be defined by statute, is based on the recognition that certain relationships
between a litigant and a prospective juror are likely to result, consciously or unconsciously, in the bias
of the juror.") (footnotes omitted).
71 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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to considerations of the possible impact of implicit bias in the courtroom,
72
as elsewhere.73
The process of voir dire, the dialog with jurors during jury selection,
has proven largely unable to detect or correct implicit bias in jurors. The
types of judicial exhortations that are typically issued, including that jurors
"remove bias from their deliberations, ' 7 4 are likely to be rejected as
irrelevant 75 and may be counterproductive. 76  The types of perfunctory
questions that are commonly asked-whether the jurors can be fair and
impartial, for example77-- are unlikely to succeed if the jurors have no
idea.78 Indeed, because of the prevalence of implicit bias, commentators,
such as the late Derrick Bell, have despaired that "even the most extensive
and penetrating voir dire will not screen the vast majority of bigoted
jurors.,
7 9
The peremptory strike, a way for attorneys to remove jurors without
having to give a reason, allows attomeys to strike jurors whom they
believe may harbor implicit bias.80  However, the peremptory strike has
been criticized as an augmenter of, rather than a protector against, bias.
Naturally, potential jurors are unlikely to give voice to their implicit bias
7 See Levinson, supra note 3, at 613 n.91 (citing Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Cal.
2004), as an exception to the general tendency of courts to be "hesitant to rely upon [implicit bias]
research in published decisions"); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups
on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1720 n.25 (1977) ("In spite of evidence that unconscious bias is
widespread and important, many courts have resisted recognition of its significance at trial.").
73 See Cecelia Trenticosta & William C. Collins, Death and Dixie: How the Courthouse
Confederate Flag Influences Capital Cases in Louisiana, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 125,
138 (2011) ("[C]ourts have turned a blind eye to racism where it is not overt and explicit.").74 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCowen, 939 N.E.2d 735, 763 n.34 (Mass. 2010); see also
Brown et al., supra note 36, at 1510 n.1 10 (noting that standard general instructions include language
such as "[t]he law does not permit you to be governed by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion").
75 See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
76 See Tabak, supra note 52, at 259 (mentioning the "pink elephant" effect, namely the risk that
"if a juror is told that which is stated in certain pattern jury instructions, i.e., 'you are not to consider
race,' the juror may end up considering race more than if the juror had not been told to avoid
considering race ... [especially] if the juror has a high degree of prejudice").
77 See Bennett, supra note 5, at 160.
78 See Levinson et al., supra note 52, at 207 n.97 ("[A]sking jurors whether they can be unbiased
is unlikely to reveal jurors with strong implicit biases."); Collin P. Wedel, Note, Twelve Angry (and
Stereotyped) Jurors: How Courts Can Use Scientific Jury Selection to End Discrimination, 7 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 293, 310 (2011) (noting that "the overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that biased
jurors are simply unaware of their biases"). For a suggestion that such questions might in fact lessen
fairness, see Brian A. Nosek & Rachel G. Riskind, Policy Implications of Implicit Social Cognition, 6
SOC. ISSUES & POL'Y REv. 112 (forthcoming 2012) (citing research from the employment context that
showed that "asking questions like 'Are you objective?' and 'Do you use the evidence and facts to
make decisions?' (to which virtually all people agree) led to greater use of gender stereotypes in a
subsequent simulated hiring decision. The researchers [whose work was cited] argued that the self-
declaration of 'I am objective' affirmed that one's thoughts arise from objective sources, so whatever
thoughts come to mind are acceptable to use.").
79 DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 331 n.2 (6th ed. 2008).
80 See Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981); Spears, supra note 67, at 1502.
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and, during a voir dire process that can be short,8 1 attorneys may learn little
about the jurors and about their implicit biases.82 Thus, attorneys often
rely on stereotypes in their peremptory strikes,83 including unconscious
stereotypes. 84  Whereas the Batson doctrine exists to protect against
purposeful discrimination by attorneys against potential jurors,85  the
doctrine fails to protect against the implicit bias of attorneys.86 In addition,
the heavy reliance that the doctrine places on judicial discretion opens the
door to the influence of implicit judicial bias.87
Thus, under the current regime, implicit bias is allowed to "flourish"88
within jurors, attorneys, and judges, 89 as the biases of one party run the risk
81 See Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 254 (2005) ("Voir dire may be as limited as brief 'yes' or 'no' group
questioning by the judge .... ).
82 Limiting the Peremptory Challenge, supra note 72, at 1720-21 ("Because attorneys often have
insufficient information to make individual judgments about the unconscious prejudices of prospective
jurors, they tend to act on the basis of stereotypes and presumptions.") (footnotes omitted).
83 Id.
84 One commentator has captured the irony by stating that "unconscious racism-which may
cause a prosecutor to attribute bias to a prospective juror by virtue of his or her membership in a
particular group-may manifest itself in a prosecutor's finding of specific bias in a juror." Note, Due
Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1022 (1989).
83 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79-81 (1986).
86 See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by
Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1024 (1996) ("Batson also
fails to recognize that much discrimination in jury selection, like discrimination generally, is the
product of unconscious racism and sexism.") (footnote omitted). Some, however, have asserted that
"purposeful discrimination" can be established by evidence that is consistent with a lack of conscious
bias. See, e.g., Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 375-76 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court in Hernandez erred in concluding that "a defendant's Batson challenge fails whenever
the prosecutor advances a nonpretextual justification that is not facially discriminatory" because
"[u]nless the prosecutor comes forward with an explanation for his peremptories that is sufficient to
rebut (a] prima facie case, no additional evidence of racial animus is required to establish an equal
protection violation"); Page, supra note 81, at 171 ("The Supreme Court, however, has never directly
clarified what it means by 'purposeful discrimination' in the exercise of peremptory challenges. There
is a conflict between the Court's language that suggests a subjective intent requirement and the Court's
statements endorsing the use of evidence that will not invariably illuminate the attorney's state of
mind.") (footnotes omitted).
87 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 67-68 (1993) ("[W]hat if the judge is racially biased too?
The Batson majority's answer-that we should trust trial judges to obey the law-is only satisfactory if
bias is conscious. If bias were sometimes unconscious, then a judge might in good faith believe she
was executing the law, but in fact be approving the racially biased action of attorneys."); Race and the
Criminal Process, supra note 48, at 1581 ("[B]ecause the prosecutor's prejudice may be subtle,
unconscious, and shared by the judge, the prosecutor may be able to articulate non-racial explanations
that the judge would find reasonable.") (footnote omitted).
88 See Bennett, supra note 5, at 150 ("[J]udge-dominated voir dire and the Batson challenge
process are well-intentioned methods of attempting to eradicate bias from the judicial process, but they
actually perpetuate legal fictions that allow implicit bias to flourish.") (footnote omitted).
89 See id. at 161 ("[T]he Batson challenge process may allow the implicit biases of the judges and
attorneys to go unchecked during jury selection.").
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of reinforcing the biases of another. The protections in place, conceived in
an earlier era, fail to address the implicit biases that are now known to
exist, and in fact may intensify them. Potential jurors who, by sincerely
professing their lack of bias, might create particular concern,90 may be left
on the jury. A call has gone out, from the judiciary as well as the
academy,9' for implicit bias research to be marshaled to address bias in
both jury selection92 and juries.93
B. Explicit Bias
The increasing focus on implicit bias should not obscure the fact that
explicit bias, meaning "the kinds of bias that people knowingly-
sometimes openly-embrace, 94 still exists and still wields power.95
1. Explicit Bias in the Courtroom
Supreme Court Justices and scholars have acknowledged the risk of
explicit bias being harbored by juries, affecting their assessment of
evidence and their verdicts. 96  They have also acknowledged the risk of
explicit bias being harbored by judges97 and, of course, by attorneys: 98
9 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 620 ("I would be especially worried about people who
really think that they aren't biased.").
91 See Arterton, supra note 4, at 1029 & n.24.
92 See Kang, supra note 18, at 1536 ("As future research confirms, constrains, and elaborates
these results, a vast research agenda will open for those who explore the nexus of law and racial
mechanics. Topics on that agenda include ... criminal law (for example, racial profiling, self-defense,
community policing, jury selection, penalty setting) .... ) (footnotes omitted).
93 See id. at 1537 (advocating a research agenda that includes "lawyering and evidence (for
example, strategies and rules with which to engage jurors' implicit biases) . .
94 Rachlinski et al., supra note 1, at 1196 (2009).
95 See Benforado, supra note 16, at 5 (providing examples of recent explicit bigotry against
minorities); Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8, at 1541 (noting that some researchers have observed
that polls may overstate the trend away from overt racism, "given the growing social unacceptability of
racial hostility"); Kang, supra note 18, at 1592-93 ("Explicit bias still thrives in many circles."); Lane
et al., supra note 32, at 430 ("Consciously held attitudes and stereotypes are also important predictors
of behavior. They are simply not the only ones to contend with as we understand human behavior and
its vicissitudes.").96 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is by now
clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority
defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or
innocence."); id at 60 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("'It is well known that prejudices often exist against
particular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate
in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others
enjoy."') (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1979)); see also Alvarez, supra note
65, at 961 ("An impartial jury is basic to the judicial system in all criminal cases. It is this impartiality
that enables the jury to analyze the evidence and to make a fair and reliable determination of guilt or
innocence. Many jurors, however, possess a state of mind that affects their ability to render an
impartial verdict; they have a conscious or unconscious bias.") (footnote omitted).
97 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986).
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hence the need for the Batson doctrine. 99
2. Existing Protections Against Explicit Bias in the Courtroom
The Batson doctrine has failed to prevent attorneys from relying on
explicit bias in jury selection. It is all too easy for attorneys who are "of a
mind to discriminate" to mask their discrimination behind a reason for
their peremptory strike that is facially neutral, whatever its intent or
disparate impact.100 Judicial policing of such strikes is ineffective." 1
Thus, attorneys continue to rely on stereotypes in making their selections,
often viewing group affiliations as an indicator of implicit bias 0 2 and often
justifying their behavior on the ground that voir dire is too short to give
them information more valuable than stereotypes. 10 3  This behavior has
been described variously as a form of prosecutorial misconduct,'0 4 and as a
regrettable requirement of zealous defense advocacy. 0 5  From the latter
camp, Abbe Smith describes the problem as follows:
It is not that I believe that racial or demographic
stereotypes are an accurate proxy for the attitudes and life
experience of all prospective jurors. I do not. It is that,
absent a meaningful exploration of the latter, I am stuck
with the former, and it would be foolhardy or worse not to
98 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 1016, 1032 & n.104 (1988) (citing Justice Marshall's Batson concurrence and its review of
data from four jurisdictions to illustrate "the overwhelming propensity of prosecutors to strike black
jurors from cases with black defendants").
99 Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How the
Batson Doctrine Enforces a Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 607,609 (2005).
1o Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)); see also United States v.
Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1162 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Batson standard, as it has been interpreted,
appears now to allow prosecutors to strike non-white jurors for reasons that are clearly, but subtly,
racial in nature ...."); Montoya, supra note 86, at 1024 ("[J]udges are apparently ill-equipped to
discern lawyer's [sic] intentions ....").
101 See Montoya, supra note 86, at 1009 ("Batson's requirement of articulating a neutral
explanation for suspect peremptory challenges creates no substantial hurdle for 'those ... who are of a
mind to discriminate,' let alone for those who discriminate unconsciously.") (footnotes omitted);
Tabak, supra note 52, at 266 (referencing several studies that "show that requiring prosecutors to
justify their discretionary challenges has an 'extremely modest' effect in reducing the racially based use
of peremptory challenges") (footnote omitted).
102 Commonwealth v. Futch, 424 A.2d 1231, 1235 (Pa. 1981).
103 See Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection in Criminal
Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 530-31 (1998).
104 Howard, supra note 68, at 374 n.25.
'o' See Smith, supra note 103, at 565 ("No matter how personally distasteful or morally
unsettling, zealous advocacy demands that criminal defense lawyers use whatever they can, including
stereotypes, to defend their clients.") (footnotes omitted).
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at least consider the generalizations on which the
stereotypes are based. 1
06
Constraints other than a lack of time prevent voir dire from providing
protection against explicit juror bias. While potential jurors may harbor
bias of which they are aware, taboos are likely to prohibit its disclosure,0 7
however skillful the questioning.'0 8 Jurors will often give the answers that
"seem acceptable."' 0 9 For example, one survey revealed that sixty percent
of people will tell a stranger on the phone that they do not believe in the
presumption of innocence; however, when asked the same question in the
courtroom, hardly a one will express anything other than complete fealty to
this noble tenet."0 In a formal setting such as the courtroom, especially
where the risk of public expulsion attends a disclosure of bias,"' racial
attitudes that might be revealed elsewhere are particularly likely to be
choked down.' 12  In addition, jurors may remain silent when asked about
bias because they do not comprehend the extent to which their biases will
affect their ability to assess the case fairly. 13 They will also remain silent
if they are "intent on giving play to their biases. ' 14 Finally, the common
practice of questioning potential jurors as a group makes a disclosure less
10 Id. at 530-31 (footnotes omitted).
107 See Charles R. Lawrence 111, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A
Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1391 (2005)
("[W]e restrict our own speech because we cannot bear admitting our own racism.").
108 See BELL, supra note 79, at 331 n.2 ("Given that much racial antipathy is unconscious or
hidden because of fear of social disapproval, even the most extensive and penetrating voir dire will not
screen the vast majority of bigoted jurors.").
109 Andrea B. Horowitz, Note, Ross v. Oklahoma: A Strike Against Peremptory Challenges, 1990
Wis. L. REv. 219, 224 n.37 ("A prospective juror may be afraid to admit during voir dire the prejudice
and bias that later causes him to vote against a defendant in the privacy of the jury room. More likely,
a juror gives responses that seem acceptable.") (citation omitted); see also United States v. Dellinger,
472 F.2d 340, 375 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Natural human pride would suggest a negative answer to whether
there was a reason the juror could not be fair and impartial.").
110 Horowitz, supra note 109, at 224 n.37.
1" See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1675
(1985) ("[J]urors would naturally be reluctant to admit [prejudiced attitudes], particularly since they
know that social disapproval will be publicly expressed by dismissing them from the venire.").
" 
2 See LESLIE HOUTS PICCA & JOE B. FEAGIN, TwO-FACED RACISM: WHITES IN THE
BACKSTAGE AND FRONSTAGE, at x (2007) ("Much of the overt expression of blatantly racist thought,
emotions, interpretations, and inclinations has gone backstage-that is, into private settings where
whites find themselves among other whites, especially friends and relatives.").
113 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 443 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Where, as in this
case, a trial court asks a prospective juror merely whether he can be 'impartial,' the court may well get
an answer that is the product of the juror's own confusion as to what impartiality is.") (footnote
omitted); Horowitz, supra note 109, at 224 ("[J]urors may not be aware of their own prejudices or may
underestimate the impact of their biases on their ability to weigh the evidence.").
"4 Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory
Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 588-89 (1998).
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likely, 15 since, as Sheri Johnson puts it, "it is easier to stay quiet




Thus, various pressures mean that jurors tend to assert that they can try
a case fairly; in turn, judges tend to accept such assertions. 1 7 In their
resolutions of questions regarding juror fairness, judges are afforded great
discretion,' 18  in part because of the importance of individualized
evaluation;" 9 discretion and individualized evaluations, of course, permit
the influence of bias.
120
There is a limited set of circumstances in which the Supreme Court
requires the questioning of potential jurors about racial prejudice.
Different standards apply depending on whether the requirement is a
constitutional one, or an exercise of the Court's supervisory power over
federal courts. For the former requirement to apply, there must be a
"constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial
prejudice, the jurors would not be indifferent as [they stand] unsworne."' 2 1
The Court has found the standard satisfied in only two circumstances. The
first, Turner, involved a death penalty sentence for an African-American
defendant convicted of killing a Caucasian. 22 The second, Ham, was the
trial of a civil rights worker, in which the defendant alleged that he was
being framed because of his work, 23 and where the Court found that racial
issues were "inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.' 24 Under
115 Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 73 (1992) ("Because overtly racist attitudes have become socially unacceptable,
people are reluctant to admit them, particularly when questioned as a group.").
116 Johnson, supra note 111, at 1675.
" 
7 See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 48, at 1583 n. 173 ("Cause challenges would be
more effective if when deciding whether to grant the challenges, judges did not rely solely on the
assertions of prospective jurors about their ability to be impartial.").
118 See Howard, supra note 68, at 380 ("A judge has broad discretion in assessing whether a juror
can, in fact, be fair, and different judges may come to different conclusions based on the same
information.").
11 See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) ("Despite its importance, the
adequacy ofvoir dire is not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge's function at this point in
the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to
impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses
to questions.").
120 See Ramirez, supra note 57, at 635 (2009) ("Thus, if one even marginally accepts the social
psychology studies that suggest bias may operate at a subconscious or unconscious level, then one must
also recognize that implicit attitudes may undermine discretionary decision making.").
121 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 (1986) (quoting Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 345-46 (4th
Cir. 1985)).
122 Id. at 29, 36 (concluding that "[b]y refusing to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice,
the trial judge failed to adequately protect petitioner's constitutional right to an impartial jury").
123 Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525 (1973) (recounting the defendant's claim that "law
enforcement officers were 'out to get him' because of his civil rights activities, and that he had been
framed on the drug charge").
124 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1979) (discussing the circumstances of Ham).
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its federal court supervisory power, the Court requires questioning on
racial prejudice where there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic
prejudice will influence the jury. 125 This standard is satisfied if a defendant
is accused of a violent crime and the defendant and the alleged victim
belong to different racial groups. 126 The Court has declined to require any
particular number or form of questions, 127 or to take away from the trial
judge "the decision whether to question the venire individually or
collectively.' ' 128 As long as the topic is "covered,"' 129 the details are left to
the judge's discretion. 13°
The Court's decisions have been subject to a variety of critiques. The
limitations on the availability of such questioning have been criticized by
Sheri Johnson as "contradicted by empirical findings on the prevalence of
prejudice,"' 131 and have been held responsible for trial judges' acquiescence
to pressures to keep voir dire short. 132 Jerry Kang's research suggests that
the doctrine is topsy-turvy, since it is precisely when race is not an obvious
issue that white juror bias is particularly likely. 133  Johnson suggests that
Turner was topsy-turvy in another way-by finding a violation only during
sentencing, and not trial. She cites research suggesting that "the
defendant's race affects guilt determinations more often than it affects
sentences; it is the subtle, unconscious alteration of judgment, not the
conscious desire to injure, that most threatens the fair administration of the
criminal justice system." 134 Even when voir dire questioning is permitted,
reliance on that device to detect prejudice has been criticized as hopelessly
121 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1981).
126 See id. at 192 ("[F]ederal trial courts must make [an inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice]
when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the victim are
members of different racial or ethnic groups.").
127 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) ("[W]e held that the subject of possible racial
bias must be "covered" by the questioning of the trial court in the course of its examination of potential
jurors, but we were careful not to specify the particulars by which this could be done."); Turner, 476
U.S. at 37; Ham, 409 U.S. at 527.
528 Turner, 476 U.S. at 37.
129 Mu Min, 500 U.S. at 431.
30 Ham, 409 U.S. at 527 ("[I]n a context where [the Court's] authority within the federal system
of courts allows a good deal closer supervision than does the Fourteenth Amendment ... [the trial
court] 'ha[s] a broad discretion as to the questions to be asked."').
131 Johnson, supra note 111, at 1681; see also Forman, supra note 115, at 71 (criticizing the
doctrine as an expression of "indifference to the need for effective questioning on these sensitive
subjects").
132 See Forman, supra note 115, at 71 ("Pressed by overcrowded dockets and dismayed by some
extreme cases, judges are more likely to curtail voir dire than to expand it.").
133 See Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 886,900-01 (2010).
131 Johnson, supra note 98, at 1022; see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 43 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("Does the Court really mean to suggest that the constitutional entitlement to an impartial
jury attaches only at the sentencing phase? Does the Court really believe that racial biases are turned




Thus, the existing doctrine leaves both implicit bias and explicit bias
largely unchecked in the courtroom. The Batson process, designed to
control the bias of attorneys as they make efforts to control the bias of
juries, is viewed by at least one member of the federal judiciary as
"thoroughly inadequate."' 136 This is in part because the process "allows the
implicit and explicit biases of attorneys to impact jury composition."'37
The peremptory strike procedure rests on the use of stereotypes, while
failing to do much for jury impartiality. 38  The potential biases of the
jurors--deemed by Susan Herman "far more critical than those of the
lawyers"-remain largely undetected. 39  Whereas the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury was designed as a safeguard against the "corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge,"'14 0 prosecutorial failings and judicial bias are in fact playing a part
in shaping the jury.
III. THE POTENTIAL SOLUTION
A. The lAT
The previous Part discussed the inadequacy of doctrinal protections
against the bias of jurors, attorneys, and judges; this Part describes a tool
whose use has been proposed in response to this intractable problem. It
emerged in the 1990s, and aimed to detect the existence, and the strength,
of certain types of implicit bias. The IAT is not the only means by which
135 William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the
Role of Jurors 'Race & Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 262-63 (2001) (describing
the notion that voir dire questioning could detect "deeply engrained and often unconscious racial
attitudes" as "wishful thinking," and presenting research supporting the argument that Turner has failed
"to purge sentencing decisions of race-linked attitudes and their consequences"); David L. Wiley,
Comment, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27
ST. MARY'S L.J. 193, 229 (1995) (stating that because the Turner approach is "at best, only effective in
excluding overtly biased jurors, it fails to account for the probability that discrimination by jurors is an
unconscious process").
136 Bennett, supra note 5, at 150.
137 id.
138 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 170 (1989) ("Peremptory challenges ensure
the selection of jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially advancing the goal of
making juries more impartial.").
139 Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TuL. L. REV. 1807, 1852 (1993) (adding that "by focusing all our
attention on how jurors are selected, we allow ourselves to ignore the fact that discrimination will still
be able to enter and hide in the jury room").
i40 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 509 n.7 (1990) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968)).
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implicit bias is measured, but it is the most prominent 14' and the most
widely employed, 142 and has enjoyed the most success at predicting
prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes. 143  Its developers include Mahzarin
Banaji, who compares her role to that of a physicist who might ask
someone to look through a telescope to see that the earth is not at the
center of the universe; her techniques allow people to look inside
themselves, and discover that the internal cosmos is not aligned as they had
thought.' 44
Versions of the JAT are available online, 145 and a pencil-and-paper
version also exists. 146 The test takes only ten minutes to complete, 47 and
provides a "compelling interactive experience.', 48 While IATs assess bias
in areas such as gender, age, and sexual orientation, 49 the racial bias IAT
has attracted the most attention. 150 This "Race IAT" asks participants to
strike a certain computer key with their left hand when an African-
American face or a "negative" attribute (such as "bad") appears on the
computer screen, and to strike a different key with their right hand when a
white face or a "positive" attribute (such as "good") appears.' 5 ' The order
is then reversed: the right hand key is struck for "positive" words and
African-American faces and the left hand key is struck for "negative"
words and white faces.'5 2  Participants are instructed to take the test as
quickly as possible.'53 The test is based upon the hypothesis that
participants will match a group to an attribute more quickly if they connect
the two in their mind, regardless of whether they are aware of the
14" Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1025 (2006).
142 Benforado, supra note 30, at 1363-64 (reporting that the IAT has "been the most widely
employed in the 'hundreds (if not thousands) of studies on implicit bias"') (quoting Jost et al., supra
note 10, at 64).
143 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 13, at 954 ("[W]ithin the critical group of studies that
focused on prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes-in other words, within the studies of implicit bias-
predictive validity was significantly greater for the IAT measures" than for self-report measures); see
also Kang, supra note 18, at 1509 (observing that the JAT "has become the state-of-the-art
measurement tool" in this field).
144 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 476.
145 PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
146 Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8, at 1543 (describing decision to use print version because
of "time and computer accessibility constraints").
147 Saujani, supra note 40, at 412.
148 Banks & Ford, supra note 20, at 1057.
149 Id. at 1060 (discussing various traits with respect to which IATs have been developed).
150 Id.
"' McKoski, supra note 56, at 320.
152 Id
153 See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An
Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 19 (2010).
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connection. 114 The computer calculates reaction time (in milliseconds) and
accuracy in completing the task. 55  At the end of the test, it tells
participants what the data suggest about the nature and strength of their
implicit bias.1
56
Taking advantage of the flexible nature of the test,1 57 and the fact that
it has not been patented,' 58 others have designed their own versions of the
JAT. Justin Levinson, for example, has designed a test that aims to
discover whether participants associate guilt with African-Americans more
strongly than with whites.'59 They do.'
60
Over six million IATs have been taken, with the results being used by
the developers to refine the test. 16' The sample of participants is, in
contrast to the typical college sample, 62 "large and diverse."' 63  The
participants have varied in gender, age, race, ethnicity, class, location, and
religion. 164  Jerry Kang describes the results as "clear and
overwhelming."'' 65  Participants "systematically preferred socially
privileged groups: Young over Old, White over Black, Light Skinned over
Dark Skinned, Other Peoples over Arab-Muslim, Abled over Disabled,
Thin over Obese, and Straight over Gay."'166  This pattern exists across
social groups. 167  LAT findings of implicit bias are perfectly compatible
with explicit commitments to equality. 1
68
The results of the Race IAT have garnered particular attention. As
154 Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007).
155 Levinson & Young, supra note 153, at 19.
156 Banks & Ford, supra note 20, at 1057.
157 See Levinson & Young, supra note 153, at 19 (describing the IAT as an "exciting and flexible"
methodology for testing implicit bias).
158 Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 23, 2005, at W12.
159 Levinson et al., supra note 52, at 190 ("[S]tudy participants held strong associations between
Black and Guilty, relative to White and Guilty, and these implicit associations predicted the way mock
jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence.").
160 Id.
161 The IAT has been "constantly" refined over the course of its use. See Banafi Testimony, supra
note 12, at 469.
162 See Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 137 (Henry L. Roediger III et al.
eds., 2001).
161 Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 141, at 1107.
164 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 477 (noting that the data have been collected from tens of
thousands of participants all over the world).
165 Kang et al., supra note 133, at 889; see also Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 470 (claiming
that of the four or five hundred "peer review" articles that have been published regarding the IAT, "less
than one percent" are critical).
166 Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58
UCLA L. REV. 465, 474 (2010).
167 Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 141, at 1047-48.
168 Kang, supra note 18, at 1559.
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Adam Benforado points out, "doctors and nurses, police officers, students,
and employment recruiters, among many others, all have demonstrated
white preference on the IAT. '' 6 9 Study participants "of European, Asian,
and Hispanic descent implicitly preferred white over black,"1 70 although an
equal number of black participants preferred black as preferred white. 
171
The results have not been "clear and overwhelming" to all.17 1 Critics
have raised questions about what it is that the IAT measures,173 and have
focused particular scrutiny on whether IAT results can predict real-world
behavior, even if they do predict discriminatory behavior in experimental
studies. 174 In response to these concerns about predictive validity, a meta-
analysis was conducted of 122 studies. 7 5  In the area of interracial
behavior and other intergroup behavior, the IAT predicted behavior better
than did the self-report method. 176 One particularly striking study involved
doctors, tasked with deciding whether to recommend state-of-the-art
thrombolytic therapy for patients with coronary artery disease. 177  As the
doctors' anti-black bias, as measured by the IAT, increased, their rate of
169 Benforado, supra note 16, at 40.
170 Lane et al., supra note 32, at 433. According to the most recent results, seventy percent of
those who have taken the "race IAT" demonstrate a preference for "European American compared to
African American." PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 145. Twelve percent demonstrate the opposite
preference. Id.
171 Lane et al., supra note 32, at 433.
172 Kang et al., supra note 133, at 889 (noting that some academics have "voiced concerns about
the proper interpretation of implicit bias scores while others have also suggested improvements for the
IAT") (internal citations omitted).
' See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 141, at 1031 ("[Variations in the mere familiarity of the
group categories activated by the LAT can lead to scores indistinguishable from those motivated by
animus toward those groups; so too can egalitarian empathy for disadvantaged social groups; so too can
performance anxiety linked to the fear of being labeled a bigot; so too can mere awareness of cultural
stereotypes and depressing socio-demographic facts."). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias,
"Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 479-80 (2007) (rebutting the
critiques put forth by Mitchell and Tetlock and arguing that their theory "does not at all undermine the
case for taking account of implicit bias in antidiscriminatory policy").
171 See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 141, at 1033.
175 Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: 111.
Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 18-19 (2009); id. at 19
(the types of behaviors covered by the meta-analysis included "a wide variety of measures of physical
actions, judgments, preferences expressed as choices, and physiological reactions"). A meta-analysis is
"a comprehensive quantitative analysis of experiments on a particular topic allowing more general
conclusions than any single study." Lane, supra note 32, at 432.
176 Greenwald et al., supra note 175, at 28. The average IAT-criterion correlation was .274, "a
level conventionally characterized as moderate." Id. Supporters such as Benforado find this evidence
indicative of the "strong" predictive ability of the IAT for racially differential behavior, judgments, and
physiological manifestations. Benforado, supra note 16, at 42; see also Kang, supra note 18, at 1514
("There is now persuasive evidence that implicit bias against a social category, as measured by
instruments such as the IAT, predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that category.").
To others, the evidence that the IAT accurately predicts discriminatory behavior is "surprisingly weak."
McKoski, supra note 56, at 321.
177 Green et al., supra note 154, at 1232.
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recommending this treatment for black patients decreased.1 78
With respect to addressing the implicit biases suggested by the IAT,
Justin Levinson cautions that overcoming them "appears to be quite
difficult, given that [they] are particularly resistant to conscious efforts. 179
It may be done, however, by "altering our informational and interactional
environment."'180  Moreover, the IAT has been used as a pedagogical tool:
it has "educated numerous professionals in the world of business,
medicine, law, law enforcement and social work."181
B. The IATin the Courtroom
Courtroom testimony relating to the IAT and implicit bias is a recent
phenomenon' 82-but it is becoming more frequent. 83 It was permitted in a
New Hampshire capital case in 2008 in support of the defendant's motion
for the death penalty to be barred because racial bias in the jury would
violate the state's equal protection guarantee. 84 Mahzarin Banaji testified,
and asserted her belief that because of implicit bias, an African-American
defendant in New Hampshire could not get a fair trial. 185  While the court
found the testimony "very interesting,"'1 6 it denied the motion, concluding
that the implicit bias research did not establish that any such bias would
178 Id. at 1235 (describing the significant interaction between doctors' "implicit antiblack bias"
and their treatment recommendations for black patients).
179 Levinson, supra note 18, at 371.
180 Kang, supra note 18, at 1562; see also infra Part V.
18 Reply to State's Objection to Defendant's Motion for Services Other than Counsel: Expert on
Implicit Racial Bias at 7, New Hampshire v. Addison, No. 07-S-0254, 2008 WL 2703957 (N.H. Super.
Ct. Feb. 8, 2008).
182 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 571; Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury:
An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC.
JUST. 139, 165 (2010) (describing the paltry results for the search terms "IAT" and "implicit bias" in
his survey of published federal and state cases).
183 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 638 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting)
(noting that in district court, William Bielby, an expert witness, testified that subjective decision
making is "susceptible to unconscious discriminatory impulses"), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011);
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076, 2006 WL 1889273, at *5-6 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006) (finding
that expert testimony on racial discrimination, including implicit biases, in Washington's criminal
justice system was admissible, relevant, and persuasive), aff'd 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010); Michael
Orey, White Men Can't Help It, Bus. WK., May 15, 2006, at 54 ("Now if an employer is faced with a
class action based on gender or race, there is at least a 50% chance that plaintiffs will cite unconscious
bias theory .... ).
184 Specifically, the trial court agreed that Mr. Addison needed the testimony in support of his
argument that McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), "no longer accords with established social
science research." Order on Defendant's Motion for Services Other than Counsel: Expert on Implicit
Racial Bias, New Hampshire v. Addison, No. 07-S-0254 (N.H. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2008).
185 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 623.
1 6 Id. at 621. The court added that "I felt like I was back in college, although I paid a lot more
attention to you than I did then." Id.
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"infect" the case at hand. 8 7  The court supported its conclusion with a
statement relating to the relationship between IAT scores and jurors'
decisions: "Preliminarily, only one unpublished dissertation has linked IAT
scores with mock jurors' individual decisions, and no studies have
examined the IAT in jury deliberations in real trials." 188
The court also noted that the IAT "does not account for the impact of
the deliberative process" that might intervene between implicit associations
and jury decisions. 89  It concluded that "statistics and social science
evidence are not sufficient to prove a discriminatory purpose in the death
penalty context."' 90
IV. THE IAT AS A SCREENING DEVICE
The first set of IAT proposals that have been made in the jury context
would involve weeding out potential jurors based on their scores. After
summarizing the proposals, this Part will examine their advantages and
disadvantages in light of the challenges laid out in Part II.
A. Details of the Proposals
Reshma Saujani was the first to float this idea, in an article that
focused on a proposal to use the IAT to determine whether legislators'
actions resulted from implicit bias.' 9' In light of the difficulty that even
experienced lawyers faced in trying to determine the "racial attitudes and
beliefs" of eligible jurors, 192 she argued, the IAT "could be a useful tool to
ferret out intentional discrimination that is hidden under a cloak of neutral
rationalizations."'
93
Mark Bennett, a district court judge for the Northern District of Iowa,
offered a proposal that aimed to address the bias of judges, attorneys, and
jurors. He suggested that courts could administer "computer or hand-
written bias sensitivity tests to potential jurors and share the results with
the lawyers before voir dire." 194 This would be a "judge-neutral and
187 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Bar Death Penalty No. 25 at 18, New Hampshire v.
Addison, No. 07-S-0254, 2008 WL 2675622 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 5, 2008).
"' ld at 18.
"
9 Id at 19.
190 Id. at 27 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-97 (1987)) (noting further that the
defendant, just as in McCleskey, "relies solely on statistical evidence and social science research to
compel the inferences that the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty was motivated by racially
discriminatory intent and any future decision by the jury to sentence him to death will be similarly
motivated").
191 Saujani, supra note 40, at 396 (arguing that the IAT may provide a measuring device for a
legislator's reliance on "unconscious racial stereotypes").
192 Id. at 419.
I93 d. at 420.
194 Bennett, supra note 5, at 170.
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lawyer-neutral method to attempt to discover and address implicit bias of
jurors, without placing the burden on attorneys, for example, to use other
expensive resources to develop strategies to address the implicit biases of
prospective jurors."' 95
Finally, Dale Larson proposed that jurors have their implicit biases
tested while waiting in jury assembly rooms, with the results made
available to judges and attorneys during voir dire.' 96 The tests would be
administered before the jurors were assigned to any particular case, and
would "test jurors for the categories most likely to generate bias that could
play a role in the cases scheduled for the day, such as age, immigration
status, nationality, poverty, sex, sexual orientation, religion, as well as for
different types of relevant professions, like police officers or corporate
executives."' 197 Each juror would take only one of these IATs, but the
results could be used as a factor in the decision whether to remove the
juror, either by peremptory strike or for cause. 98
B. Advantages of the Proposals
Proposals of this nature could, in theory, tackle bias in jurors,
attorneys, and judges. Implicit bias on the jury could be reduced because
those with the highest scores would be removed, without any need to rely
on the vagaries of self-reporting,' 99 and all members of the jury might gain
increased awareness of implicit bias from the experience of taking the
TAT. 200  The effect of implicit and explicit bias on attorneys exercising
peremptory strikes might be lessened because they could now replace their
ignorance about the jurors with concrete knowledge.20' In addition, by
participating in a discussion about implicit bias, attorneys might become
more vigilant about their own.20 2 Similarly, judges focused on the problem
of implicit bias, and given more information about the potential jurors,
might be more able to counteract their own implicit and explicit bias when
ruling on challenges for cause and peremptory strikes. 203
In a case that expanded the Batson doctrine, Justice Kennedy justified
'
95 Id. at 170.
196 Larson, supra note 182, at 169.
197 id,
"'8 Id. at 167.
199 See Spears, supra note 67, at 1499 n.29 ("[T]he judge must ordinarily base his decision
[regarding challenges for cause for actual bias] entirely on the juror's self-evaluations.").
200 See discussion infra Part V.
201 Montoya, supra note 86, at 1013.
202 See Page, supra note 81, at 261 ("[L]awyers should be made aware of the possibility, or
likelihood, that they are unconsciously using race- and gender-based stereotypes .. "); Tabak, supra
note 52, at 260 (noting that Vincent Southerland of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., remarked that "talking about race can expose ... explicit and implicit biases and can sensitize
everyone in the courtroom to the issue of race and its potential influence in the courtroom").
203 See Tabak, supra note 52, at 260.
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his rejection of reliance on stereotypes in the exercise of peremptory
strikes in part because "[o]ther means exist for litigants to satisfy
themselves of a jury's impartiality without using skin color as a test.,,204 If
a litigant believes that a prospective juror harbors explicit or implicit
biases, he added, "the issue can be explored in a rational way that consists
with respect for the dignity of persons, without the use of classifications
based on ancestry or skin color. 2 °5 While his words have been described
as "somewhat Delphic,"206 at least one commentator has gleaned amidst
the murk some support for developing rational means of detecting racial
bias.207 What could be more rational than a scientific test that produces a
ranked score, on the basis of which "neutral" decisions can be made?
208
C. Disadvantages of the Proposals
Ambitious though they are, these proposals involve significant
disadvantages. The first relates to the question of the connection between
an IAT score and any real-world phenomena that would affect the
impartiality of a juror. Some of the strongest critiques on this front have
been voiced by Gregory Mitchell, who stated: "[T]o date, no empirical
research has established that any particular score on the IAT reliably
predicts any particular behavior in any particular setting., 20 9 It is important
in this context to resist the scholarly tendency to focus on implicit bias in
juries only in connection with the ultimate decision-the verdict-rather
than focusing on the ways in which implicit bias can affect the jury at
every stage of its work:210 the evaluation of each witness,zl each piece of
204 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991). Justice Kennedy added that
"[t]he quiet rationality of the courtroom makes it an appropriate place to confront race-based fears or
hostility by means other than the use of offensive stereotypes." Id. at 631.
20' Id. at 631.
206 Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak About Voir
Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 163, 289 (2005); see also Judith Heinz, Comment, Peremptory Challenges in
Criminal Cases: A Comparison of Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 201, 235 n.198 (1993) (referring to the textual context in Edmonson as being
"ambiguous").207 See Phoebe A. Haddon, The Litigator's Dilemma: "Should I Confront or Ignore Concerns
About Racism, Sexism or Other Isms in My Case?, " 36 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 253,
256 (1999).
208 See Spears, supra note 67, at 1500 (arguing that "there is not sufficient certainty involved in
detecting unconscious or concealed biases to make them grounds for court-controlled challenges").
209 Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 MCGEORGE L. REv. 687, 710-11 (2009).
210 See Levinson, supra note 18, at 364 n.92 ("Scholarship in the area of race and juries for the
most part focuses either on the ultimate decision of the jury or on areas like eyewitness identification.
These projects often overlook the powerful workings of unconscious bias in the various stages of legal
decisionmaking.").
211 See Veronica S. Tetterton & Stanley L. Brodsky, African Americans on the Witness Stand:
Race and Expert Witness Testimony, in CRrrICAL RACE REALISM 94, 94 (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds.,
2008).
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202 212FRMN HEJRevidence,212 and so on. The distinction between thoughts or associations,
on the one hand, and behavior or actions on the other,213 is a porous one: a
juror's impressions are absolutely critical,214 and form part of a juror's
actions. 215  They are unlikely to be erased as the result of an epiphany
during deliberation. 21 6  Thus, looking for real-world consequences of
implicit bias may overshadow the need to have a jury that is impartial
throughout the trial. In addition, several studies have now linked IAT
scores to behavior by real-world decision-makers such as doctors,
2 17
judges, 218 and employers. 219 It remains true, however, that a specific IAT
score does not possess sufficientpredictive validity to justify the IAT's use
in this kind of selection context.
The second concern relates to the fact that, even if one could
accurately divine implicit racial bias, each of us is a repository of various
biases, overlapping and conflicting, 22' and implicit and explicit.222  It is
212 See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 249 (1992) ("The sifting of evidence is
guided at many points by one's general beliefs about how the world works, including beliefs about
various classes of people. Stereotypical beliefs can generate inferences from the evidence to the
finding of fact and thereby introduce improper bias in adjudication.").
213 See, e.g., Vedantam, supra note 158, at W12 ("[T]he tests do not measure actions. The race
test, for example, does not measure racism as much as a race bias.").
214 See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 531-32 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (explaining that a defendant has the right "to present his case to neutral and detached
observers capable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict"); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145
(1936) (asserting that impartiality "is a state of mind").
215 Intuitive first impressions are inevitable in adjudication. Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and
Experience in the Sotomayor Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 263, 284-85 (2010) (arguing that
adjudication will inevitably involve intuitive decision-making). They can even influence deliberative
decisions. See Irwin & Real, supra note 63, at 7 (describing how, "[t]o the extent that deliberative
[judicial] decisions are based on carefully weighing available options and factors," implicit biases
might have a significant impact on judges' decision-making).
216 See B. Michael Dann, From the Bench: Free the Jury, 23 LITIG. 5, 6 (1996).
217 See Green et al., supra note 154.
218 See Rachlinski, supra note 1.
2"9 See Dan-Olof Rooth, Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World
Evidence, 17 LABOUR ECONOMICS 523, 529 (2010) (reporting on a Swedish study finding "strong and
consistent negative correlations" between a participant's score on the Arab-Muslim IAT and the
likelihood of inviting an "applicant with an Arab-Muslim sounding name for an interview").
220 See Nosek & Riskind, supra note 78 (manuscript at 17) ("[T]he circumstances of predictive
validity are not yet well enough understood to anticipate when or how much a particular implicit bias
will influence behavior.").
221 See Kang, supra note 18, at 1502 n.59 ("[T]here is the possibility of schemas canceling each
other out on some relevant metric, for example if the target is simultaneously a member of one ingroup
and one outgroup.").
222 See Armour, supra note 57, at 750-51 ("[S]ocial and personal categories include information
about social groups (e.g., blacks, women, gays and lesbians), social roles and occupations (e.g.,
spouses, maids, police officers), traits and behaviors (e.g., hostile, crime-prone, patriotic, and
intelligent), and social types (e.g., intellectual, social activists, and rednecks).").
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unlikely that only one type of implicit bias will be relevant,2 3 and jurors
might override their implicit biases with countervailing explicit
preferences.224 In addition, because of the complex nature of bias, and of
trials, the result of one implicit bias score may not persuade attorneys to
abandon their discriminatory methods. In any event, they may be more
interested in trying to address explicit bias in jurors than implicit bias.
Another set of concerns relates to the effects of this proposal on jurors.
Requiring jurors to take an LAT may trigger juror privacy concerns 225 and
increase the unpopularity with which jury service is viewed.226 Some
evidence suggests that if the disclosure of implicit bias creates anger and
shame, it can lead to an increase in stereotyping. 27 Even though no such
effect has been demonstrated with the IAT, the specter of jurors provoked
into new depths of bias militates in favor of caution. Paradoxically, the
risk might be particularly great for whichever party appears most likely to
have requested such a screening, since questions to potential jurors about
racial attitudes might be viewed, and punished, as "playing the race
card. 228 Clarence Darrow might have been able to triumph in a trial in
which he told the all-white jury "I haven't any doubt but that every one of
you is prejudiced against colored people,"229 but lesser attorneys might
shrink from that role.
It should be added that those who developed the IAT, as well as other
223 See Benforado, supra note 16, at 38 ("Key associations-both positive and negative-relate to
'race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, social status, and other distinctions."') (quoting Jost et al., supra
note 10, at 39).
224 Devotees of Paul Butler, for example, might vote to nullify certain prosecutions against
African-Americans, whatever their implicit biases. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 715-18 (1995); see also Armour,
supra note 57, at 749 ("One reason it seems so anomalous to apply the value-laden term 'sexist' to
feminists is because feminists have both renounced the cultural stereotype about women and developed
egalitarian personal beliefs about women. Thus, feminists have two distinct and conflicting cognitive
structures concerning women: the cultural stereotypes and their egalitarian personal beliefs. Similarly,
low-prejudiced people have two conflicting cognitive structures concerning blacks: the black cultural
stereotype and their nonprejudiced personal beliefs.").
211 See Jury Service and the Jury System, 43 Hous. LAW. 24, 32 (2005) (discussing jurors' privacy
concerns regarding the questionnaires that they fill out); Vedantam, supra note 158, at W12 (describing
takers of the IAT who did not want their results revealed.).
226 See Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court Policies
and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18, 18 (2001) ("Numerous studies document that perceived
insensitivity to the privacy concerns of prospective jurors is one cause of dissatisfaction with jury
service.").
227 See Bartlett, supra note 29, at 1966 ("[A]nger and shame . . . increase the likelihood of
stereotyping.").
228 See Motion to Bar Death Penalty No. 25: The Unavoidable Impact of Race Makes the Death
Penalty Unconstitutional in this Case, New Hampshire v. Addison, No. 07-S-0254, 2008 WL 2703965
(N.H. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2008) (noting that in some mock juror studies, defendants are negatively
impacted if their attorneys are judged to have adopted such a race-based strategy).
229 Herman, supra note 139, at 1851 (quoting Clarence Darrow, Summation in the Sweet Case, in
2 THE WORLD OF LAW, THE LAW AS LITERATURE 350-51 (Ephraim London ed., 1960)).
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scientists, 230 have indicated their belief that this tool is not appropriate for
jury selection,231  "[e]specially at this early stage of the IAT's
development. '" 232 As Banaji puts it, the LAT is "not a test of DNA," but
rather a test that will "give you a sense of some of the things that can be in
your mind that you're not aware of."23 3  Thus, in navigating the IAT
website one encounters repeated warnings that the results are provided "for
entertainment and educational purposes only., 234  Banaji states that she
rejected the jury screening possibility despite the fact that people
"constantly ask me how I can go to sleep every night arguing this when in
many courtrooms in this country the measure of race bias is fairly
minimal. 235
The IAT should be rejected as a screening device for potential jurors
because these disadvantages outweigh the advantages of the proposal. At
least in the IAT's current state of development, the proposal is vulnerable
to the Banks and Ford critique of "fruitless attempts to ferret out individual
bias . . .,,23 Those with resources available to improve the screening of
jurors would be better served by investigating those questions that do
appear to have some success at subtly probing implicit bias,2 37 and
increasing awareness of them across the economic spectrum.238
V. THE IAT AS AN EDUCATIONAL DEVICE
The other set of proposals relating to the TAT in the jury context would
involve using it not as a screening device, but as a means of educating the
230 See Kang & Lane, supra note 166, at 477-78 ("[N]early all scientists have discouraged using
the [AT in high-stakes individual selection contexts, such as judicial nominations.").
231 See Vedantam, supra note 158, at W12 (noting that one of the [AT's developers would testify
in court against use of the [AT to "identify biased individuals" because such a use "assume[s] that
someone who shows bias on the test will always act in a biased manner"); Understanding and
Interpreting IAT Results, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/
understanding.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2011) ("Can (or should) people use this test to make decisions
about others? Can one, for example, use this test to measure somebody else's automatic racial
preference, and use it to decide that they should or should not serve on a jury? We assert that the IAT
should not be used in any such way. Especially at this early stage of the IAT's development, it is much
preferable to use it mainly to develop awareness of one's own and others' automatic preferences and
stereotypes.").
232 Understanding and Interpreting 1ATResults, supra note 231.
233 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 516.
234 Id.
23 Id. at 516-17.
236 Banks & Ford, supra note 20, at 1122.
237 See Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 530-31, 568-69.
238 See Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L.
REv. 369, 416 (1992) ("Rare is the criminal defendant who can afford to retain consultants or whose
case is sufficiently noteworthy to attract volunteers."); id. at 371 (describing how the availability of
peremptory challenges "favors those, such as the government or the wealthy, who can commit
substantial resources to lawsuits over those who cannot").
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jury about implicit bias. This could involve educating jurors about their
own implicit bias, by administering the test, or instructing jurors on what
tests such as the IAT reveal about implicit bias in the broader population.
This Part outlines the various proposals, and then conducts a comparative
evaluation.
Various commentators have hinted at the possibility that the LAT could
be administered to jurors before they start their work, in order to allow
them to learn about implicit bias. Susan T. Fiske, a social psychologist,
has written that she wishes that the IAT could be given to all judges and
juries, because "as a didactic tool, it's amazing. '' 239 Banaji testified that itwould be of great interest to her
to have this Court and any other Court think about this,
how can we give it to people who are part of the decision
making in any environment, to be able to take something
like this, in the privacy of their own minds to know what
there is and to use it in the same ways they would use any
other educational material.240
Jerry Kang suggests that one option is "debiasing booths in lobbies where
jurors wait to be picked, 24' although he does not specify whether the IAT
would lie behind the curtain. Similarly, while not explicitly proposing the
IAT, Justin Levinson has floated the idea of "using racial stereotype
measures on pretrial jury questionnaires, and nonthreateningly confronting
jurors with their biases during voir dire or jury instructions. 242 While the
proposals remain vague,243 they have scholarly comrades in the form of
proposals that the JAT could usefully be given to judges, not as a screening
device, but so that they could have some sense of the impediments to
impartiality.24
239 Susan T. Fiske, Stereotypes in the Litigation of Work/Life Conflict, 27 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
47,47 (2006).
24
0 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 517.
241 Kang, supra note 18, at 1537.
242 Levinson, supra note 18, at 414.
243 Id. at 414 n.322 ("The exact method of how to nonthreateningly confront jurors should be
studied carefully .... Before implementing any juror confrontation scheme, the specific design should
be tested empirically.").
244 See McKoski, supra note 56, at 321 ("The inappropriateness of the Implicit Association Tests
as a screening device does not diminish the fact that the tests are a powerful and personalized starting
point in educating judges about implicit bias."); Miller, supra note 54, at 1012 (suggesting that judicial
training could begin to incorporate experiments "in which judges are assessed for bias. The point of
these exercises [would] not [be] to embarrass these public servants, but to enable them to understand
their own baseline cognitive biases so that through their higher cognitive processes they may
compensate for these biases."). Paul Butler, however, does not rule out the possibility that the IAT
could serve both an educational and a screening purpose in the process of selecting nominees to the
Supreme Court. See Butler, supra note 25, at 1042 ("Given the high-stakes work of Supreme Court
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Others suggest educating jurors about the results of tests such as the
IAT simply by describing the results. Judge Bennett has taken the lead in
preaching-and practicing-jury instruction on implicit bias. He discusses
implicit bias with his jurors during voir dire,245 and covers implicit bias in
24the instructions that he gives before opening statements. 46 His instruction
on this topic draws on his knowledge of IAT results and was drafted in
consultation with the United States Attorney and the Federal Defender for
his district.247 The instruction reads:
248
Do not decide the case based on "implicit biases." As we
discussed in jury selection, everyone, including me, has
feelings, assumptions, perceptions, fears, and stereotypes,
that is, "implicit biases," that we may not be aware of.
These hidden thoughts can impact what we see and hear,
how we remember what we see and hear, and how we
make important decisions. Because you are making very
important decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you
to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist jumping to
conclusions based on personal likes or dislikes,
generalizations, gut feelings, prejudices, sympathies,
stereotypes, or biases. The law demands that you return a
just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your individual
evaluation of that evidence, your reason and common
sense, and these instructions. Our system of justice is
counting on you to render a fair decision based on the
evidence, not on biases.249
While Judge Bennett is unaware of any colleagues who have followed
his lead,250 several scholars have endorsed the idea that jurors should be
instructed on implicit bias. Susan Herman has suggested that attorneys or
judges should be permitted "to educate jurors, using available social
Justices, . . . some assessment of their unconscious bias seems useful, even if the results are not
publicly disseminated. Requiring an LAT might, for example, be part of the vetting process before a
judge is nominated. For a judge who is not overtly racist, knowledge of his own unconscious bias
could serve as an important check when deciding a case involving a person of color. In the case of a
prospective nominee for whom there are racial concerns, an IAT score demonstrating little or no bias
would be significant evidence in that person's favor.").
245 Telephone Interview with The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, U.S. Dist. Court, N.D. Iowa (July




249 Judge Bennett jury instructions (on file with the author).
250 Bennett Interview, supra note 245; see also Bennett, supra note 5, at 169 (stating that judges
fear that implicit biases will only worsen if attention is drawn to them).
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science data, not in an attempt to select imaginary bias-free jurors, but to
educate the jurors actually selected[.], 251  Her suggestions of ways in
which jurors might learn about their biases include
[r]equiring judges to allow expert testimony on the impact
of racism on jury verdicts, to give juries a meaningful
charge about the potential effect of bias on jury
deliberations (prepared with the assistance of nonlegal
experts on bias and jury psychology), and perhaps to
include a carefully prepared videotape on this subject as
part of ajuror education program .... 2S2
Others have echoed her suggestions of implicit bias education at stages
such as juror orientation253 and jury instruction.254
Thus, the educational proposals can be divided into two groups
according to the period during which the education would begin-pre-trial
or during the trial-and can also be divided into two groups according to
the educational method-teaching through experience or teaching through
the imparting of information. The following Sections provide a
comparative evaluation of these proposals by considering both the
temporal and the methodological axes. Section V.A addresses the question
of when implicit bias might best be introduced to the jury, and Section V.B
addresses the question of how it might best be introduced to the jury.
Finally, Section V.C brings these two questions together to propose a
model that merits testing.
A. Comparison of When
In comparing those proposals that would begin to educate the jury
about implicit bias before the trial-that is, during the orientation period
for potential jurors-with those that would begin once jurors are assigned
to a particular case, this Section discusses the existing state of juror
orientation and whether an introduction to implicit bias could usefully be
included.
251 Herman, supra note 139, at 1851.
252 1d. at 1851-52.
253 Kang & Lane, supra note 166, at 500; Larson, supra note 182, at 170 (suggesting "techniques
to raise awareness of possible bias including pre-jury selection videos").
254 Brown et al., supra note 36, at 1531 (proposing the following instruction: "All of us, no matter
how hard we try not to, tend to look at others and weigh what they have to say through the lens of our
own experience and background. We each have a tendency to stereotype others and make assumptions
about them. Often we see life and evaluate evidence through a clouded filter that tends to favor those
like ourselves. I urge you to do the best you can to put aside such stereotypes, for all litigants and
witnesses are entitled to a level playing field in which we do the best we can to put aside our
stereotypes and prejudices.").
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255Milling around like cattle in the jury assembly rooms, potential
jurors have good reason to feel as neglected by the system as they are by
the scholarly community. 25 6 Potential jurors also have good reason to feel
neglected by the advocacy community. Although one judge describes it as
a tenet among the criminal defense community that juror orientation
materials are just one part of the "indoctrination" to which jurors are
subjected throughout the judicial process,257 attorneys are often unaware of
the materials to which potential jurors are exposed,2 8 and have been urged
to remedy that failure.25 9 The juror orientation materials are, after all,
"preliminary instructions. ' 260
Perhaps as a result of this lack of attention, juror orientation programs
are "haphazard and vary from state to state, county to county, and court to
court .... Many courts play a videotape or DVD in the room where
potential jurors sit and wait for jury service, or, more typically, for
dismissal.262 Prospective jurors pay more attention to the videos than to
the juror handbooks that were previously the norm. 263 Existing educational
initiatives have, however, been criticized as inadequate, 264 because they
255 See Thomas L. Hafemeiser, Juror Stress, 41 ADVOCATE 14, 16 (1998) ("Jurors may [... ] feel
that they are being processed via a 'cattle call."').
256 See Elizabeth Najdovski-Terziovski et al., What Are We Doing Here? An Analysis of Juror
Orientation Programs, 92 JUDICATURE 70, 70 (2008) ("[W]hile there is a plethora of research on juror
comprehension and decision making, the literature on juror orientation is virtually nonexistent.").
251 Michael P. Toomin, Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431-A
Journey Back to the Future and What it Portends, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 83, 101 (1998) ("From defense
counsel's standpoint, the reality of the situation is that indoctrination is pervasive in our criminal justice
system.").25
8 See G. Thomas Munsterman, Jury News, 19 CT. MANAGER 40, 41, available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/res-juries-jurynewsjurorient.pdf ("Although the production
of orientation tapes is usually handled carefully ... I doubt that all attorneys have seen these tapes.
The Connecticut case [Connecticut v. L'Heureaux, Nos. MV 02 34555, CR 03 80373 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 7, 2004), in which a defense motion resulted in changes to jury orientation videotapes] is a
reminder to us that we should be very careful as to the contents of these tapes.").
259 See id. (explaining how attorneys "should remain concerned" that the information provided to
jurors is "accurate and consistent").
2o Id. (citing L "Heureaux, a case in which a defense motion resulted in changes to jury orientation
videotapes, in support of this proposition).
261 Franklin Strier, The Road to Reform: Judges on Juries and Attorneys, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1249, 1253-54(1997).
262 Ruth V. McGregor, State Courts and Judicial Outreach, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1283, 1290
(2008); Munsterman, supra note 258, at 40.
263 See Hon. Larry L. Lehman, Re-Examining Wyoming's Jury Trial Procedures-An Introductory
Letter, I Wyo. L. REV. 91, 117 (2001) ("Many jurors apparently feel that they do not receive a
sufficient orientation to jury service, and a juror orientation videotape may help jurors feel more
comfortable and confident about jury service.").
264 See, e.g., Dann, supra note 216, at 64 ("In most jurisdictions, prospective jurors are given a
cursory orientation in the jury assembly room .... ); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2003) ("When [those summoned] arrive at the courthouse for jury duty,
they may be given a brief lecture by the judge, or shown an orientation videotape. These introductions
are usually a combination of solemn reminders of the vital importance of the jury in a democratic
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"undermine the jury's ability to process information efficiently and
accurately, '265 and proposals have been made for them to be expanded
"into a more extensive educational orientation.,
266
Discussion of implicit bias is largely absent from orientation materials,
despite its relevance to many of the functions that the materials are
designed to serve. Those functions include explaining to jurors "the
meaning of the rule that the case must be decided on the evidence only";
267
instilling "information about the jury trial that may affect the jurors'
understanding of the process",;268  instructing jurors as to their
responsibilities; 269 and "alerting jurors to problems of bias., 270  It is not
even a given that anything will be said about bias in these materials: the
topic is entirely missing from some videos.271 There is no mention of bias
in New York's much-heralded orientation video,272 the production of
which cost $150,000,273 and which includes such eye-popping features as
an opening scene "set in a barren landscape and featur[ing] a cast of
hooded villagers who seem to have arrived in the Balkans by way of 'The
Crucible.' ' 274  In those videos where bias is mentioned, details are rarely
society, earnest exhortations to take their responsibility seriously, and practical information about the
length of the lunch hour and the process of reimbursement. The main actors (judge, lawyers, bailiff)
are sometimes identified, and occasionally jurors will be told a little about the law, such as the
distinction between civil and criminal cases. Usually this is all the advance information they get.").
265 j.j. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely
Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 337 (explaining how jurors are "generally left uninformed" and
usually "receive very little guidance on how precisely they should make the most of what they see and
hear").
266 Keith Broyles, Note, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for Educating the
Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 731-32 (1996).
267 Strier, supra note 261, at 1254.
268 FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES: HOW TO WRITE AND
USE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 11 (2010).
269 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 1,7-8 (2005).
270 Munsterman, supra note 258, at 41.
271 See, e.g., Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County, Jury Service in Arizona, JUDICIAL
BRANCH OF ARIZ. (last visited Dec. 16, 2011),
http:/lwww.superiorcourt.maricepa.gov/JuryServices/Generaltnformation/juryServiceVideo.asp; Cobb
County Superior Court Administration, Juror Informational Videos, COBB COUNTY
http://sca.cobbcountyga.gov/video.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2011); Idaho State Judiciary, Jury Service
in Idaho, IDAHO STATE JUDICIARY, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/videos/juryvid.wmv (last visited Dec. 16,
2011); Texas Young Lawyers Association, American Juror Video, AMERICAN JUROR,
http://www.americanjuror.org/video.htm# (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
272 The closest thing to a mention of bias is the statement that jurors need "an open mind, fairness,
the ability to reconsider your opinions, and common sense."
http://www.nyjuror.gov/JOVideoScripts.shtml. This kind of admonition is extremely similar to that
found in a New Hampshire video that was claimed by Banaji to have "zero impact." See Banaji
Testimony, supra note 12, at 567 (the video "instructs jurors to be fair, impartial and unbiased and
open-minded and not to base decisions on guesswork").
273 Rebecca O'Brien, Neighborhood Report: Greenwich Village--City People; For the Spielberg




given as to what it involves and how to address it.2" This silence has
stirred a little scrutiny from court-watchers, with the North Dakota
Commission on Gender Fairness in the Courts recommending that more
should be done to tell the jury about its obligation to act in a "bias-free
manner. ' 276 The Commission identified orientation materials as one means
by which "the intrusion of bias into jury functions could be minimized,'
277
and encouraged the creation of a video that would include a segment
discussing "gender stereotypes and how they are improper in the justice
system. 2
78
Including information about implicit bias in jury orientation makes
sense for a number of reasons. First, this concept is relevant to a number
of the topics already covered in orientation videos.279 Second, research on
such phenomena as "primacy," 280 "priming,'28t  "framing, ' 282  and
275 See, e.g., Court Information, Jury Orientation Video Transcript, BUCKS COUNTY, Ohio,
http://www.buckscounty.org/courts/Courtlnfo/JuryDuty/VidTranscript.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2011)
("Once on a jury it's your duty to act fairly and impartially."); Ideals Made Real: California's Juror
Orientation Video, CALIFORNIA COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/2599.htm (last visited Dec. 16,
2011) (featuring a former juror confiding that "I think it's fairly difficult for people to come into the
jury and not have some bias. But there's the issue of bias, and there's the issue of trying to keep an
open mind[,]" before moving on to a different topic); Jury Duty, the Lamp of Freedom, EATON
COUNTY, Michigan, http://www.eatoncounty.org/index.php/courts/ury-information.html ("Like any
good judge, you must be as free as humanly possible from bias, prejudice, or sympathy for either
side."); Hawai'i goes a little further than others. See Jury Pool Orientation Video, VIMEO,
http://vimeo.com/2147756 (last visited Dec. 16, 2011) ("Personal opinion and prejudices should not
become a part of the decision-making. Every person entering the courthouse is entitled to equal
treatment, regardless of race, national origin, gender, religion, disability status, sexual orientation,
marital status, or age. As jurors, you have a duty to make decisions with an open mind, so it is
particularly important that you strive to recognize and guard against possible biases. Consider only the
facts presented in the trial, in relation to the law, and form your own conclusions.").276 A Difference in Perceptions: The Final Report of the North Dakota Commission on Gender
Fairness in the Courts, 72 N.D. L. REV. 1113, 1147 (1996).
211 See id at 1176 (adding that "[t]hese methods could be undertaken immediately and without
further research").
278 Id.
279 See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
280 The "primacy effect" relates to the way in which an "ultimate judgment is manipulated as a
function of the information that comes earlier." Hyatt Browning Shirkey, Note, Last Attorney to the
Jury Box is a Rotten Egg: Overcoming Psychological Hurdles in the Order of Presentation at Trial, 8
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 582-83 (2011).
281 Priming "refers to a process in which a person's response to later information is influenced by
exposure to prior information." Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using
the Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 306 (2010); see also
Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How "Legal Priming"
Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (2005) (priming ofjurors
probably begins "at the moment the citizen receives a summons"); Barbara O'Brien & Daphna
Oyserman, It's Not Just What You Think, but also How You Think About It: The Effect of Situationally
Primed Mindsets on Legal Judgments and Decision Making, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 149, 151 (2008)
("Psychologists have repeatedly shown that activating or 'priming' a knowledge structure in one
context can influence judgments in a separate, unrelated context. Once activated, a knowledge
structure can affect how one interprets subsequent ambiguous events to which the primed construct
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"cognitive filtering, 28 3 has made clear that impressions formed early on
can shape the understanding of what follows, 284 and, indeed, can shape
what follows. 28 5  Third, addressing the topic during orientation mitigates
the risk that resource inequalities or court rulings286 will determine whether
relates."); id at 157 (discussing "mindset priming," and concluding that "[t]here is every reason to
think that various situational factors-such as how case materials are presented or the manner in which
jurors are treated-affect the mindset of legal decision makers"); id at 169 ("[S]ituational cues can
prime a way of making sense of the world that affects how people perceive evidence and receive
arguments."); Shirkey, supra note 280, at 583 ("Simple priming can dramatically affect the presumed
causation of behavior.").
282 See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for
Law, LegalAdvocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1150 (2006) ("[E]very frame defines
the issue, explains who is responsible, and suggests potential solutions."); Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J.
1, 42 (2004) ("[T]he way in which an issue is presented to us significantly influences how we perceive
it. Psychologists have dubbed this the framing effect. Even minor alterations in the presentation of
options that are substantively identical seem to influence our perceptions and attitudes regarding the
options."); Shirkey, supra note 280, at 585 ("Framing is a process whereby communicators,
consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given
situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner."); id. at 586 ("Altering identical scenarios
exclusively through different frames can have dramatically different effects on judgment."); id. at 587
("[F]raming affects what people do and do not perceive .... ).
283 See Gail A. Jaquish & James Ware, Adopting an Educator Habit of Mind: Modifying What It
Means to "Think Like a Lawyer, " 45 STAN. L. REV. 1713, 1716 n.5 (1993) ("The term 'cognitive filter'
refers to the attitudes, values, beliefs, and knowledge that comprise a person's conceptual framework of
the world. For each of us, our cognitive filter (stemming from our cumulative life experiences) shapes
how we interpret events and the behavior of other humans."); see also Albert J. Moore, Trial by
Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273, 304 (1989) (stating that cognitive
filters "select and limit the knowledge we draw upon when making judgments under uncertainty").
284 See HOW TO WRITE AND USE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, supra note 268, at § IV(A)
(discussing an orientation video that "contains information about the jury trial that may affect the
jurors' understanding of the process"); Shirkey, supra note 280, at 591 ("Primacy, priming, and
framing are quick, unconscious, and unintentional, but have a powerful and lasting effect.").285 See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: How JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES
Civic ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 159 (2010) ("[T]he most important opportunity to
frame the public's perception of jury duty comes when citizens arrive at a courthouse to begin their
brief stint as jurors."); Blasi, supra note 8, at 1277 ("Although there is a certain Orwellian irony to the
idea, our system of justice might be more evenhanded if the televisions in jury assembly rooms were
programmed with both apparent and subliminal fairness primes amid the usual fare of soap operas and
reruns of Judge Judy."); B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating
Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1248 (1993) (stating that orientation has the
advantage of "responding to jurors' pre-existing 'frames of reference' or 'stories' that they use as
cognitive filters while hearing evidence"); Najdovski-Terziovski et al., supra note 256, at 70
("[Orientation] is a juror's first human contact with the system, and the time at which they are likely to
be most overwhelmed by their surroundings. Impressions formed, and knowledge gained, at this stage
are likely to impact on their perception of the process as a whole, and their ability to perform their
task."); Trenticosta & Collins, supra note 73, at 18 ("[T]he Confederate flag [outside the court house]
impermissibly primes the expression of negative views towards African-Americans.").
286 Some courts have barred attomeys from discussing with the jury their concerns about bias.
See, e.g., Daniels v. Burke, 83 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding denial of questioning on racial
bias); Stanton v. Astra Pharma. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1983) (criticizing attorney
for saying to the jury that: "' [W]e were concerned about the effect of having black people come to an
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implicit bias is addressed,287 or that jurors may punish the attorneys
assumed to have requested bias education. 88
Finally, many of those who urge that implicit bias is malleable
emphasize that internal motivation to be fair is a crucial component of
efforts to exploit that malleability.2 89  It is motivation to our highest
impulses that many of the orientation videos already seek to induce. With
lofty titles like "Ideals Made Real, 290 or "Jury Duty, the Lamp of
Freedom, 29' orientation videos aim to inspire,292 by, as Thomas
Munsterman put it, "instilling pride in the jury trial and its place in a
democracy., 293  There is good reason to think that these videos could
succeed in their motivational efforts, given that potential jurors generally
arrive at the courthouse eager to perform their civic duties correctly,294 or
can be encouraged to feel that way. 295 If the videos do succeed, an implicit
area where there are not many black people and expecting to get justice from a jury which is mostly
white people'); see also Forman, supra note 115, at 70 ("Many judges refuse to allow probing into
sensitive areas that are inevitably the most crucial, such as racism or sexism.").
287 See Armour, supra note 51, at 768 ("[Group] references that challenge the factfmders to
reexamine and resist their discriminatory responses enhance the rationality of the fact-finding
process."). Relying on attorneys to have the knowledge, and the skill, successfully to evoke these
concepts threatens to expand, even in the process of attempting to address, inequalities.
288 See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 11, at 223 ("'Playing the race card' in order to influence
White jurors could be a risky endeavor .... [[]f claims of racial injustice or police misconduct are
perceived by Whites as baseless or as manipulative attempts to get a seemingly guilty defendant off the
hook, the strategy might actually backfire. Empirical research suggests that suspicion about the ulterior
motives of attorneys can undermine their attempts to influence mock jurors."); see also Armour, supra
note 51, at 747 ("[l]n formal legal proceedings, finding a nonracial reason to discriminate against a
black litigant is especially easy to do---one simply gives more weight to the evidence favoring the
opposing litigant."); Kang et al., supra note 133, at 912 (suggesting that jurors actually influenced by
conscious and unconscious bias about the race of the ideal litigator incorrectly convinced themselves
that differing attorney conduct was the cause of their judgment about attorney competence).
289 See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 8, at 1276 ("The effects of motivation can be introduced in many
different ways. What seems to matter most is whether antidiscrimination norms are activated, either
directly or indirectly.").
290 Ideals Made Real: California 's Jury Orientation Video, supra note 275.
291 Jury Duty, the Lamp of Freedom, supra note 275. Richard Delgado's Rodrigo expresses
optimism that patriotic symbols might help in the debiasing project. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy, and the State, 41 UCLA L. REV. 721, 727 (1994) ("On formal
occasions, such as in court, when serving on a jury perhaps, the average American can sometimes get
beyond race. You have all those reminders-the flag, the robes, the judge, the solemn words-that cue
you that this is an occasion where the formal values, the higher, official ones, are to preponderate.
Other, more intimate occasions do not evoke those same values."). See also Richard Delgado,
Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751,
773 (2000) ("Because the formal values have become corrupted by an overlay of discriminatory
practices, participants must constantly remind everyone to follow the American Creed.").
292 Munsterman, supra note 258.
293 Id.
294 See Ellsworth, supra note 264, at 1390 ("When people are chosen to serve on a jury, they are
generally anxious to perform their task well, and eager for guidance on how to be a good jury.").
295 See Blasi, supra note 8, at 1277 (discussing research findings that "goals like fairness can, in
effect, be 'injected' into people .... For example, it appears that merely seeing or hearing words like
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bias education project that relies on motivation would do well to be
positioned during orientation, where that patriotic wave swells,296 and
before it has been dashed.297
For all these reasons, education on implicit bias merits consideration as
a component of juror orientation. The next Section addresses the question
of how that education might best be effected.
B. Comparison of How
In their methodology, the proposals that jurors merely be instructed
about this topic line up with what B. Michael Dann calls the law's "ideal
juror. '298 According to that framework, jurors are, among other things:
* [P]assively acted upon;
• [E]xpected merely to observe;
* [E]mpty vessels to be filled;...
* [C]omplete and accurate recorders of information;
[and]
" [C]apable of suspending judgment on evidence
and issues until the end of the case.299
This view does not square with what is now known about actual
jurors.300 A rather different set of traits belongs to the "actual juror," who,
among other things:
• [P]ossesses pre-existing frames of reference;...
'fairness' can cause people to behave as if they are more committed to being fair, entirely without the
conscious knowledge of the subjects.").
296See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERS. SOC.
PSYCHOL. REv. 242, 248 (2002) (explaining that Whites may "moderate automatic stereotypes if those
stereotypes appear to be discrepant with social norms").
297 See Bartlett, supra note 29, at 1901 ("Positive strategies that affirm people's good
intentions ... engage people constructively in defining their better, nondiscriminatory selves and
aligning their conduct accordingly."); id. at 1903 ("Good intentions are ... a form of social capital that
should be fostered, like any other asset. They can be nurtured, or they can be squandered.").
298 Dann, supra note 216, at 5.
299 Id. at 5-6.
300 See id. at 6 (noting that the view "is based on assumptions or wishful thinking about human
behavior and our adversarial system, not on empirical validation").
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* [H]as selective and otherwise imperfect recall of
the law and the evidence;
* [A]ctively processes information as received, by
evaluating and classifying evidence and making
decisions prior to deliberations;...
* [U]ses "cognitive filters" during trial; [and]
" [S]elects evidence that best fits her frame of
reference or tentative verdict choice.3°'
The persistence of the passive role for jurors is not only part of an
inaccurate view of the "ideal juror," but also damaging to the ability of
jurors effectively to do their work.30 2 Judge Dann has claimed that the
consequences of this passive role are "juror confusion, impairment of
opportunities for learning, distraction, and boredom., 30 3 Jurors who are
active, rather than passive, are more likely to learn, more attentive, and
"less likely to become confused or to forget the evidence or the law."304
The disadvantages of the passive juror role are particularly evident in
the orientation period, where juror boredom and disengagement present
huge risks. Of those potential jurors present for jury selection or
orientation in district courts in 2010, only 22.7% were actually selected to
serve on a jury trial;30 5 14.3% were never even called into a courtroom. 306
In some state courts, the likelihood of serving is even smaller.30 7 Thus, the
risk is significant that after days of waiting, the potential juror will be sent
home, having received little of value, and having provided nothing of
value. Many jurors express frustration at being summoned for jury service,
301 Id.
302 Id. at 5.
303 Id. at 6; see also id. at 5 (advocating that each juror instead "should be a participant in an
interactive process").
304 Id. at 6; see also id. at 5 (linking the passivity of the traditional juror role to "unacceptably low
levels ofjuror comprehension of the evidence and of the court's instructions").
305 UNITED STATES COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-PETIT JUROR SERVICE ON DAYS JURORS




3 0 7 See, e.g., THE COMMISSION ON THE JURY, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE JURY
TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 31 n.47 (2004), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/CommjurylnterimPReport.pdf (describing a 2004 study in New
York revealing that "10-15% of jurors who actually report are never chosen for a venire or reached
during a voir dire process"); Judith S. Kaye, My Life as Chief Judge: The Chapter on Juries, N.Y. ST.
B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 10, 14 ("Sadly, only 18% of those summoned to jury service [in New York] will
actually get selected for a trial.").
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only to take an extensive questionnaire and then be dismissed.30 8 They
have come to assume that their time will be wasted, and that efficiency will
not be achieved. 30 9  Leaving jurors neglected and unengaged during
orientation risks seducing them into a passive mindset that will prove
unproductive at trial, and lulling them into a boredom that will reduce their
sense of investment in the legal process.
Passive learning is particularly problematic on the topic of bias.
Implicit bias is far more pervasive than self-reports would suggest.10 In an
area that is, as Banaji states, as "deep and dark as prejudice," 311 denial will
be the default.31 2 Thus, an instruction to jurors that they must not be
prejudiced is likely to be largely accepted-and largely useless.3t 3
Educators outside the jury context have advocated methods of learning
about implicit bias that involve not passive exposure to information with
which one may already agree, but rather the active experience of feeling
the workings of implicit bias within oneself. Their techniques are used in
teaching doctors,31 4 judges,31 5 and graduate students,31 6 including law
308 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1, 28
(2007) (discussing the fact that perhaps as many as eighty percent of jurors are frustrated that they
report for jury duty only to fill out a "comprehensive, probing questionnaire" and then be sent home).
309 See, e.g., Janet Stidman Eveleth, Will Jury Reforms Attract More Jurors?, MD. B. J., May-
June 2000, at 42, 44.
310 See supra Section II.A.
311 Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 477.
312 See Davis, supra note 29, at 1565 ("Anti-black attitudes persist in a climate of denial.");
Johnson, supra note 98, at 1030 ("Denial... is a property of unconscious racism.").
313 See Bennett, supra note 5, at 157-58 (noting that it is "unrealistic to expect that jurors, who are
given only crude instructions about how to decide a case, will somehow overcome their implicit biases
in considering questions presented to them"); Blasi, supra note 8, at 1275 ("[M]ost of us are resistant to
believing that our own thinking could be marred by irrational processes.").314 See Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REv. 599, 635 &
n.1 1 (2011) (discussing various means of combating unconscious bias in white doctors, and concluding
that "[o]f course, the best way to create a culturally competent white doctor is through experiential
learning with minority students, not formal cultural competency training or workshops").
3 15 The National Judicial College's model curriculum has introductory materials that are
"designed to experientially bring to the consciousness of attendees how their thoughts and actions are
based on their culture and background." Ramirez, supra note 57, at 630-31 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The course "provides active-learning experiential activities in which students share common
experiences that are intended to alert them that they may be susceptible to implicit associations that
inhibit their cultural competence." Id. at 631. Rachlinski has called for these kinds of techniques to be
introduced more widely, noting:
[O]ne problem with [judicial education], at least as it exists at this time, is that it
is seldom accompanied by any testing of the individual judge's susceptibility to
implicit bias, or any analysis of the judge's own decisions, so the judges are less
likely to appreciate and internalize the risks of implicit bias.
Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 1228. Rachlinski further asserts that, "[t]herefore, while education
regarding implicit bias as a general matter might be useful, specific training revealing the
vulnerabilities of the judges being trained would be more useful." Id.
students.317 Cynthia Lee has advocated a similar method in the context of
jury instructions. 318  Lee recommends a "race-switching" instruction in
certain self-defense cases, which would tell jurors that if they are in doubt
about whether their assessments have been impaired by racial stereotypes,
they should try mentally switching the race of the participants to see
whether their assessments would remain the same. 319  Through this
method, jurors have the chance to experience the bias that might otherwise
have gone unnoticed.320  Banaji has emphasized that the IAT similarly
316 See Andrea Kupfer Schneider et al., Leadership and Lawyering Lessons from the 2008
Elections, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 581, 599-600 (2009) (discussing various methods of
educating students about biases).
317 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Teaching Employment Discrimination, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 755,
766 (2010) (stating that the author has law students in her employment discrimination class take the
"Implicit Bias Test" in order to demonstrate that "even good people such as themselves are affected by
unconscious biases").
318 See Lee, supra note 17, at 489 (stating that studies have shown that jury instructions can
reduce the influence of racial bias on jurors).
319 Lee's "race-switching [instruction] involves [having the jurors] imagin[e] the same events, the
same circumstances, the same people, but switching the races of the parties" of the case. Id. at 482.
Lee's proposed instruction would read as follows:
It is natural to make assumptions about the parties and witnesses in any
case based on stereotypes. Stereotypes constitute well-learned sets of
associations or expectations correlating particular traits with members of a
particular social group. You should try not to make assumptions about the
parties and witnesses based on their membership in a particular racial group. If
you are unsure about whether you have made any unfair assessments based on
racial stereotypes, you may engage in a race-switching exercise to test whether
stereotypes have colored your evaluation of the case before you. Race-switching
involves imagining the same events, the same circumstances, the same people,
but switching the races of the parties. For example, if the defendant is White and
the victim is Latino, you could imagine a Latino defendant and a White victim.
In intraracial cases in which both the defendant and the victim are persons of
color, you may simply assign a different race to these actors. For example, if
both the defendant and victim are Black, you may imagine that both are White.
If your evaluation of the case before you is different after engaging in race-
switching, this suggests a subconscious reliance on stereotypes. You may then
wish to reevaluate the case from a neutral, unbiased perspective.
Id. One of the potential drawbacks of this proposal is that "many jurors already have made up their
minds before the closing argument." Armour, supra note 51, at 771. However, in the case cited by Lee
where a race-switching instruction was used, the instruction formed only one part of a "five-part plan
for addressing the racial dynamics of the case." CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN:
PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 256 (2003); see also infra note 320 and
accompanying text.
320 Lee refers to this as a very "tangible way" for jurors to learn about the possibility of implicit
bias. Lee, supra note 17, at 565. At least one defense attorney has persuaded a judge to give an
instruction modeled on Lee's proposal. That case, in which an African-American teenager argued self-
defense after being charged with hitting a white teenager in the head with a hammer, ended with a not
guilty verdict. LEE, supra note 319, at 256; see also James McComas & Cynthia Strout, Combating the
Effects of Racial Stereotyping in Criminal Cases, CHAMPION, Aug. 1999, at 22, 24 (stating that the
judge in that case, in agreeing to give the instruction, noted "that he personally engaged in a race-
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stuns test-takers32' as they discover their physical inability to make
associations that defy the pull of implicit bias.322 It is the experiential
education about one's bias that forms "the essence" of the IAT.323
In addition, the passive learning model has already been tried with the
jury in the conventional form of jury instructions-but with those
conventional instructions, the result has been widespread
incomprehension, 324 with troubling and racially disparate consequences. 325
For all these reasons, the goal of introducing implicit bias to the jury
during orientation through interactive, experiential education is appealing.
Whereas efforts have been made to counter juror boredom and
frustration-through videotapes displaying polished production
techniques, 326 dramatic plot devices, 327 and celebrity participants,328 and, in
switching exercise whenever he was called upon to impose sentence on a member of a minority race, to
insure that he was not being influenced by racial stereotypes").
321 See Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 475 ("I believe very much that the way in which
people can really understand what this work is about is by participating in it themselves."); id. at 476.
322 See id. at 510 (claiming that when those who take the IAT have to make associations that run
counter to their implicit biases they "mostly fall apart"); id. (describing being "stunned").
323 See id. (adding that she thought about demonstrating the test for the court by taking it herself,
so that "you could see my bias, but I don't think it is going to actually show you, in your own gut, the
degree to which you have it"); id. at 513 (describing "the ah-ha moment"); id at 536-37 ("[W]hen you
take the test you will actually feel in your gut, in your mind, the inability to do certain things... I don't
need to wait for the test result to come back, that's how amazing some of these experiences are.").
324 See MARCUS GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUSTICE 228 (1968) ("Probably the most discouraging
part of a trial is the time when the judge tries to cram into twelve non-legal minds all the law applicable
to the case at hand. The blank expressions on the faces of the citizen-jurors is pitiful; it is matched only
by the bleak look on the judge as he plods through the legal terminology that he knows is making little,
if any, impression on his listeners.") (footnote omitted); Dann, supra note 216, at 65 ("Jurors frequently
have difficulty understanding instructions because they are too technical, they use legal terms, and they
are poorly organized."); Ellsworth, supra note 264, at 1389-90 ("At the end of the trial, before sending
the jury off to deliberate, the judge reads aloud a lengthy set of instructions on the law, typically ending
with a few brief snippets of advice about how to conduct their deliberations. The one clear task they
are given is to choose a foreperson, in jurisdictions where the foreperson is elected. The rest is typically
vague and lofty, not much more useful than the initial orientation."); Steven M. Smith & Veronica
Stinson, Does Race Matter? Exploring the Cross-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification, in CRITICAL
RACE REALISM 102, 110 (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds., 2008) (noting that cautionary jury instructions
"have been found to be effective if they contain easy-to-understand and accurate information" but
"[u]fortunately jury instructions are typically prepared by a judge or legal scholar who may have little
knowledge or understanding of empirical findings").
325 See Lynch, supra note 16, at 195 (asserting that mock jurors who did not understand the jury
instructions were more likely to vote to impose the death penalty on a Black defendant and more likely
to vote to impose a life sentence on a White defendant).326 See J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1503 (1996) (describing professional-quality juror orientation videotapes that
have been found to be informative, educational, and attention-grabbing).
327 See Munsterman, supra note 258, at 40 (stating that the "cliff-hanging device is used to good
effect" in these videos).328 New York hired Ed Bradley and Diane Sawyer for this task. O'Brien, supra note 273, at 6
(noting that the video "keep[s] exasperated citizens entertained and informed while they wait for jury
selection" and "is one of the tools designed to make an often loathed activity slightly more palatable").
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New York, through the introduction of a juror newsletter that includes
"lively stories and even a crossword puzzle" 329-- these efforts may have
been misdirected. Engaging jurors as active participants in the project of
resolving cases fairly is more closely aligned with what the judicial system
needs from them, and is also more likely to bring them satisfaction, 330 as
opposed to leaving them "frustrated by their passive role." 33' Experiential
learning through a tool such as the IAT offers the promise of engaging the
jurors in an exercise that could enhance their understanding of themselves,
their instructions,3 32 and the challenge ahead of them. 3 3 These measures
could put them in an active learning mindset,334 which would increase their
levels of comprehension and performance during trial.335
C. Bringing When and How Together
Sections V.A and V.B advocated greater attention to the nature of jury
orientation, and greater use of active, experiential learning by jurors.
These goals possess independent force, since orientation has faults that
could be addressed by means other than experiential learning,336 and
experiential learning can be usefully introduced in phases of the trial other
Raymond Burr narrates a similar video in Washington State. Mary Pat Treuthart, A Summer's Tale: Of
Marriage, Feminism, and Jury Duty, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 293, 294 (1996). In North Carolina,
Charles Kuralt narrates. Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in the Distribution of Jury Service, 39
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 601,631 (2005).
329 Eveleth, supra note 309, at 44 (noting that a "national trend to improve jury service and entice
more jurors to participate in the process" has been identified); James P. Levine & Steven Zeidman, The
Miracle of Jury Reform in New York, 88 JUDICATURE 178, 179 (2005); see also id. (describing a juror
newsletter, "Jury Pool News," which was created "to help jurors endure the boredom of waiting
periods").
330 See Dann, supra note 285, at 1243 ("[T]he active juror is more likely to have an effective and
satisfactory learning experience."); see also Strier, supra note 261, at 1254-55 (noting that "well-
executed orientations" can increase juror satisfaction because jurors tend to perform their duties more
effectively).
331 Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Allan Reifinan, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 788, 813 (2000).
332 Jurors who believe that they "play a critical role in a difficult and extremely important
decision, and that they should take their duties seriously and work hard to perform them in the most
scrupulous possible manner" have a better chance of understanding their instructions. Id. at 814.
333 See Prescott & Starr, supra note 265, at 337.
334 See Dann, supra note 285, at 1242-43 ("The active juror model contemplates juror interaction
with the judge, attorneys, and others from the time the jurors first report for duty through the post-trial
debriefing."); Patricia W. Hatamyar & Todd P. Sullivan, Active Learning and Law School
Performance, 3 J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY RES. 67, 67 (2011) ("[S]tudents learn better as active, self-
reflective participants in the learning process, rather than passive recipients of information.").
335 See Dann, supra note 216, at 6 (linking juror passivity to confusion, distraction, boredom, and
"impairment of opportunities for learning"); Ellsworth & Reifnan, supra note 331, at 813 ("[Blecause
current trial procedures discourage active participation and force jurors into an entirely passive role,
jurors are prevented from performing to the best of their ability.").
336 See supra Sections V.A-B.
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than orientation.33 7 However, a proposal that addresses both goals, such as
the use of the IAT as an experiential learning device during orientation, has
particular appeal, for a number of reasons. It puts jurors into an active
learning mode from their first entry into the courthouse, which helps to
minimize disengagement, prepares potential jurors for their ideal role
during trial, and enhances the likelihood that they will understand their
subsequent instructions.338 Use of the IAT, in addition, harnesses civic
energy and enthusiasm that otherwise might melt away and re-solidify as
frustration;3 39  provides a compelling starting-point for a subsequent
discussion of bias within the courtroom, a conversation that might
otherwise be difficult to initiate,340 and that judge and attorney might
benefit from hearing;341and allows and encourages the potential jurors to
give a more nuanced and informative answer than "yes" when asked
during voir dire whether they can be impartial.
For those who believe that the lessons that can be learned from the IAT
have value that extends beyond jury service, an additional benefit lies in
the public education opportunity that this proposal creates.342 Jury service
has a long history as a source of public education,343 and that tradition
could be continued with public education on implicit bias-a project that
Banaji compares to the public health project of educating members of the
337 See Lee, supra note 17, at 481 (discussing the race-switching instruction that could be given to
juries to protect against juror reliance on racial stereotypes).
338 See supra Sections V.A-B.
339 See id.
340 See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
341 See supra text accompanying notes 36-39; see also Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8, at
1556 (noting that for capital defense lawyers "introspection about racial stereotypes and reactions, as
well as vigilance concerning those effects on others, is necessary"); Ramirez, supra note 57, at 629-30
(stating that education that informs judges of "alternative perspectives and implicit associations should
enhance impartiality in discretionary decision making").
342 See Lee, supra note 17, at 487 (discussing possibility that her race-switching instruction could
benefit society by raising social consciousness).
343 See Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1169, 1186 (1995) ("'To regard the jury simply as a judicial institution would be taking a very narrow
view of the matter, for great though its influence on the outcome of lawsuits is, its influences on the
fate of society itself is much greater still. The jury is therefore above all a political institution, and it is
from that point of view that it must always be judged .... [The jury] should be regarded as a free
school which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights .... I do not know whether a jury
is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case. I regard it
as one of the most effective means of popular education at society's disposal."') (quoting ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969) (1840));
Brown et al., supra note 36, at 1511-12 ("The jury trial is a way to educate lay people about important
social and political issues, the law, and the obligations of citizenship in a community. As one of the
few places where the average citizen can directly participate in the governmental process, the jury trial
provides an ideal forum for a dialogue about racism, cognitive processes, and the persistence of
employment discrimination.") (internal footnotes omitted).
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public about their blood pressure. 3" In the case of the JAT, even if six
million people have taken it,345 that leaves over three hundred million
within the United States who have not. If potential jurors who take the
IAT while waiting to see if they will serve on a jury learn something about
implicit bias that enhances their subsequent experiences and behavior
beyond the courthouse, there may be public benefits that mitigate the time
away from dependents and from work.
Research has indicated that the process of taking the IAT and seeing
the results can help address implicit bias.346 For example, research into the
effects of implicit bias, and implicit bias education, on doctors, offers
support for the use of IATs to educate jurors. As mentioned above, in a
recent study a group of physicians were given a Race IAT, and asked
whether they would recommend state-of-the-art treatment for patients with
coronary artery disease.347 For those who were unaware of the nature of
the study, the greater their implicit anti-black bias, the less likely they were
to recommend the treatment for black patients.348 For those who were
aware of the nature of the study, however, the greater their implicit anti-
black bias, the more likely they were to recommend the treatment for black
patients.349 In addition, after the IAT was administered, the percentage of
participants who believed that subconscious racial biases affected their
treatment decisions increased from sixty to seventy-one. 350 Three quarters
of the participants felt that education about unconscious bias, and
specifically taking the IAT, offered benefit to physicians. 51 The study's
authors interpreted their results as suggesting that "implicit bias can be
recognized and modulated to counteract its effect on treatment
decisions,' 352  and suggested the use of "securely and privately
administered IATs to increase physicians' awareness of unconscious
344 See Banaji Testimony, supra note 12, at 517 ("In both cases we know that knowledge is
superior to ignorance, and if we know... what that was we'd do the equivalent of shaping our mental
health in the same way as we shape our bodily health.").
345 See supra text accompanying note 161.
346 See Saujani, supra note 40, at 409-10 ("Studies show that the IAT test-taker's prejudices can
actually be reduced once an individual is confronted with his unconscious prejudices. . . . Once
individuals take the [AT and get their results, they can then stop and ask whether thoughtless adherence
to racial stereotypes is affecting their decisions. If so, decision-makers can take remedial measures to
prevent or diminish unconscious use of race-specific criteria.").
347 Green et al., supra note 154, at 1235.
341 Id. at 1234.
349 Id. at 1234-35.
310 Id. at 1235 ("Before completing the IAT section of the study, 60.5% of physicians agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement: 'Subconscious biases about patients based on their race may affect
the way I make decisions about their care without my realizing it.' When shown the same statement
after taking the IATs, 71.6% of physicians agreed or strongly agreed with this statement.").
311 Id. ("Meanwhile 74.8% felt that taking IATs is a worthwhile experience for physicians, and
76.1% felt that learning more about unconscious biases could improve their care of patients.").
352 Id. at 1237.
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bias. 353
This study supports the use of the TAT as an educational device, as do
other studies suggesting that exposure to the TAT can have an impact on
beliefs and behavior; 354 the usefulness of such a device with jurors,
however, remains untested. 5 Testing would need to be conducted before
any new procedure was implemented. The following proposal is offered as
one that merits testing:356 that existing videotaped orientations maintain
their invocation of egalitarian norms and their efforts to inspire their
audience to honor those norms, but relate those norms to information about
implicit bias;357 that this information include an introduction to the IAT,
with the potential jurors offered the opportunity to take an IAT; and that
the potential jurors be provided with either the paper version or access to
the online version of the TAT,358 with the assurance that the results would
be for their own edification only. A separate feedback section could
monitor jurors' perceptions of the experience, to investigate whether it is
stoking resentment.359 The IAT would be optional-in light of the findings
that internal motivation has a greater chance of addressing implicit bias
than external motivation.3 6 ° While this might mean that those who could
most benefit from the IAT would decline to participate,361  a more
productive conversation could occur during voir dire or deliberation even if
353 Id.
354 See Nosek & Riskind, supra note 78 (manuscript at 16) (giving examples).
355 See Levinson, supra note 18, at 411-12 ("[S]tudies indicate that confronting jurors with their
implicit biases, striving for more diverse juries, and facilitating a more counterstereotypic community
of lawyers and judges could help reduce the occurrence of implicit memory bias. It must be noted,
however, that before any concrete suggestions should be implemented, more research must be
conducted to confirm that these changes would improve legal decisionmaking.").
356 One important topic of such an investigation would be the risk of "rebound effect," a
phenomenon in which "even if effort suppresses stereotypes in the first instance, stereotypes return
with greater force when the pressure is relaxed." Bartlett, supra note 29, at 1943.
357 These materials could be produced with the agreement of the prosecution and the defense bar,
as in the case of Judge Bennett's jury instructions on implicit bias. See supra note 251 and
accompanying text.
358 For an analysis of a paper version of the IAT, see Kristi M. Lernm et al., Assessing Implicit
Cognitions with a Paper-Format Implicit Association Test, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN
PREJUDICE (Melanie A. Morrison & Todd G. Morrison eds., 2008).
359 Thanks to Lauryn Gouldin for this suggestion. For an encouraging indication of the
palatability of the IAT, see Nosek & Riskind, supra note 78 (manuscript at 16) ("[O]n average,
participant evaluations after completing the measures at the [IAT developers'] website are highly
favorable ... ").
360 Leslie R. M. Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of External and Internal Motivation to
Control Prejudice on Implicit Prejudice: The Mediating Role of Efforts to Control Prejudiced
Responses, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 216-17 (2004).
361 See Ward et al., supra note 21, at 770-71 ("Evidence ranging from the increased selection of
neutral positions or 'don't know' on social surveys related to race to candid expressions of a lack of
interest in matters of racial and ethnic group relations in qualitative interviews suggests [an increase
among whites] in racial apathy in the contemporary United States.") (internal citations omitted); id. at
771 (stating that "racial apathy is more common to whites").
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less than the full contingent of jurors had taken the test.362 While each
juror would take only one IAT (addressing race, for example, or gender),
the test would be contextualized for the jurors, so that it could serve as an
example of one of the many types of cognitive bias to which jurors are
vulnerable,363 and indeed to which all those whose behavior the juries have
to evaluate-police officers, civilian witnesses, and so on-are vulnerable.
Jury instruction could usefully reinforce, 64 and be reinforced by,3 65 this
introduction to implicit bias. The aim of an intervention such as this would
not be to eliminate bias, but to raise awareness of it in such a way as to
combat its influence on jurors' judgments.366
VI. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
This Part briefly addresses three possible objections. The first relates
to the role of social science in law; the second to the project of tackling just
one aspect of bias; and the third to juror diversity as an alternative means
of addressing implicit bias.
A. Social Science in Law
Social science has been the source of many proposals for jury
reform,3 67 but efforts to shape the law in response to social science findings
are controversial.368  The newness of implicit bias research and the IAT
adds to the controversy. 369  While the rich literature on the role of social
362 See Herman, supra note 139, at 1852 n. 164 ("It is too much to expect to influence every juror
[on the topic of unconscious bias], but influencing a few would be a start.").
363 Contrast the weakness in restricting an IAT screening proposal to just one form of implicit
bias. See supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
364 See Commission on Gender Fairness in the Courts, supra note 276, at 1176-77 ("[A] pattem
jury instruction requiring jurors to act in a bias-free manner would reinforce principles first brought to a
juror's attention in the orientation videotape.").
365 See Bradley Saxton, How Well do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 109-10 (1998).
366 See Nosek & Riskind, supra note 78 (manuscript at 11) ("Possessing an implicit preference or
stereotype does not guarantee that it will influence behavior. Even when conditions are aligned for a
particular social cognition to influence judgment, people may engage corrective processes to avoid
such an influence."); id. ("Direct experience with one's own implicit biases may initiate 'cues for
control,' lead people to monitor their decisions more carefully, and initiate corrective efforts when
unwanted thoughts are noticed.").
367 See Dann, supra note 216, at 5 ("Increasingly, legal authorities and social science institutions
have questioned how juries function during trial, and have called for major reforms in the way our legal
system utilizes and affects jurors.").
368 See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 141, at 1116 (noting that "[m]any judges and legal scholars
have learned to be wary of social scientists bearing intellectual gifts"); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as
Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1141-42 (1999) (arguing that cognitive bias lies beyond what the law can
or should deal with).
369 See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Phillip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37
HOFsTRA L. REv. 737, 755-56 (2009).
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science in law is beyond this Article's scope, 370 a couple of points can be
made. First, the core resistance to the importing into law of this type of
social science relates to proposed changes to substantive legal rules, 371
372such as the standards for proving employment discrimination, or an
Equal Protection violation.373 Rules, it is argued, must be predictable.374
No change to a substantive legal rule is proposed here. Second, concern
also centers on the prospect of people being held liable for discrimination
that was not consciously intended or committed.375 Such a prospect is seen
as in tension with norms of fairness.3 76 No liability for implicit bias is
proposed here. Rather, this proposal hopes to ensure that before a jury
commences a process that may lead to the imposition of liability, it has
learned something about the types of bias that threaten norms of fairness.
B. A Small Slice of the Bias Pie
A second set of concerns relates to the question of whether focusing on
one type of bias creates a harmful disregard for, or distraction of resources
from, inequality throughout and beyond the legal system.377
Why focus on juries, one might ask, when most cases end before
370 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 98, at 1026.
371 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 13, at 951 ("The very existence of implicit bias poses a
challenge to legal theory and practice, because discrimination doctrine is premised on the assumption
that, barring insanity or mental incompetence, human actors are guided by their avowed (explicit)
beliefs, attitudes, and intentions."); Levinson, supra note 18, at 352 (calls for legal reform in response
to growing scientific proof of implicit bias often "critique a substantive legal rule or construct").
372 See Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1613, 1676-77 (2011).
373 See Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building
Upon Charles Lawrence's Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40
CoNN. L. REv. 1175, 1199 (2008) ("We now possess the science, the hard evidence, and the
educational tools necessary to educate both the judiciary, and the public, about the realities of implicit
bias and its implications for anti-discrimination law. Our next step is to marshal this evidence, and the
public's support, to mount a constitutional challenge to the Intent Doctrine [of Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence].").
374 See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 369, at 755-56 (asking whether, if the IAT's inventors
were to alter their definition of what constitutes "slight, moderate, and strong bias," courts and
legislatures should defer to their judgments).
375 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 27, at 963 ("Legal scholars who have applied cognitive theory
to legal problems have focused primarily on its usefulness in proving that unconscious bias influences
an individual decision-maker's actions and thereby renders those actions discriminatory and
unlawful."); Lindsay Nash, Expression by Ordinance: Preemption and Proxy in Local Legislation, 25
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243, 276 (2011) ("Even those who recognize that unconscious bias exists may
remain uneasy about the propriety of legal liability in such cases; the absence of either intent or
consciousness might suggest that the decision-maker is less blameworthy or perhaps that, even if he or
she were aware of the bias, is unable to control his or her unconscious impulses.").
376 See Nash, supra note 375, at 276.
377 See, e.g., Banks & Ford, supra note 20, at 1120 (arguing that focusing on "unconscious bias"
leads to a "misguided preoccupation with individual acts of discrimination").
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trial? 78 Why focus on jury bias, when by the time a jury decides the fate
of a criminal defendant he or she will already have been through a system
whose racial disparities are massive379 -and present at arrest, arraignment,
indictment, plea negotiation, and every other stage of the criminal
process? 380 Why focus on jury bias when he or she will already have been
subject to the judgment of numerous other parties who are vulnerable to
implicit bias, both those inside the criminal justice system-law
enforcement officers,38' prosecutors,382 defense attorneys,383 judges,384 and
witnesses 385-and those outside it?386 Why limit one's focus to defects in
the jury system, when other aspects of the trial raise fairness questions,
311 Of the 81,372 defendants in federal criminal court who reached adjudication in 2009, 78,283
pled guilty; 2798, or 3.4%, faced a jury trial. Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc (follow "Offenders sentenced: tables" hyperlink: then
select year "2009"; then select "Case disposition"; then select "All values"; then select "Frequencies"
and "Percents"; then select "HTML"). In a recent survey of California dispositions, only 0.6% of
Superior Court cases were resolved as a result of a jury trial. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2010
COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 44 (2010), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/csr2010.pdf; see also Alsehuler, supra note 138, at 230 ("Battles over
trial procedures typically disregard the pressures that our legal system places on defendants to abandon
the right to jury trial. A system that can afford Batson hearings and that can expend its resources
asking prospective jurors whether they are bigots apparently cannot afford to provide trials to the
people it accuses of crime.").
379 Levinson et al., supra note 52, at 201.
380 See Benforado, supra note 16, at 28 (noting that African-Americans "receive harsher treatment
from the moment they encounter a police officer all the way through sentencing"); Mona Lynch &
Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the
"Empathic Divide," 45 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 69, 97 (2011) ("[T]inkering with the final stage of a
process that disproportionately impacts poor and minority defendants at each prior stage will only have
limited impact on racially disparate outcomes."); Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 11, at 201-02
("[R]esearch on prejudice in the legal system has examined racial biases other than those demonstrated
by jurors (e.g., discrepancies in arrests, indictments, and plea bargaining).").
391 See ALEXANDER, supra note 39, at 104 (stating that law enforcement officers "become
increasingly harsh when an alleged criminal is darker and more 'stereotypically black' [while] ... they
are more lenient when the accused is lighter and appears more stereotypically white").
382 See Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of Editorial and Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Perpetuation of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 601, 629
(1992).
383 See Benforado, supra note 30, at 1366-67 ("Every day, jurors, witnesses, defense attorneys,
prosecutors, parole officers, and prison guards, among others, are also making vital judgments that may
be influenced by implicit racial bias."); Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense Attorney Plea Recommendations
and Client Race: Does Zealous Representation Apply Equally to All?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413,
413-14 (2011) (arguing that disparities in sentence length and incarceration rates between African-
Americans and Caucasian-Americans are in part due to the plea bargains that defense attorneys
recommend that these clients accept).
384 See Ward et al., supra note 21, at 772 ("[J]udges harbor implicit biases much like others in the
population, and these biases may have some bearing upon judgment.").
385 See Tabak, supra note 52, at 254 (discussing studies raising doubt about the reliability of
eyewitness testimony when race is implicated).
386 See Jost et al., supra note 10 (discussing implicit bias in areas such as medicine and
employment).
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such as the likelihood that a defendant's fear of cross-examination on prior
convictions might keep valuable testimony from the jury?38 7 Why focus on
proposing new protections, when existing anti-discrimination protections,
such as Batson, are not yet working effectively?388  Why argue about the
meaning of "millisecond reaction-time differentials on computerized
tests,"3 89 when inequities beyond the workings of the individual brain are
indisputable,390 such as racial disparities in the foundational areas of life
expectancy, health, food, schooling, and housing?
39
'
Each of these questions has validity. Yet that does not mean that
nothing should be done about implicit juror bias;392 a rare opportunity
exists with jurors in that as they prepare for jury service they expect and
hope to be educated.393 Judges, for example, may be less open to
instruction.394 In addition, there are several reasons why a focus on
implicit juror bias would add resources to, rather than leaching them away
from, these other projects. First, the proposal to engage prospective jurors
in learning about implicit bias during orientation aims to expand the
resource pie by harvesting civic enthusiasm, time, and energy that is
otherwise likely to be wasted. It also aims to increase investment in the
legal system 95 and comprehension of the law.396 Second, an understanding
387 See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record-Lessons
from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 492-97 (2008) (proposing
restrictions on impeachment to encourage defendants to testify).
388 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson 's Net to Ensnare More Than
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1077-
78 (2011) (proposing a "fix to what ails Batson").
... Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 369, at 738.390 See Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism,
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1557 (2004) (using the term
"biographical racism" to capture "the accumulation of race-based obstacles, indignities, and
criminogenic influences that characterizes the life histories of so many African-American capital
defendants"); Lynch & Haney, supra note 380, at 69 (stating that sociolegal scholarship "has made
clear that racial factors shape legal outcomes through a complex interaction of individual-level, group-
level, situational, and structural forces").
391 See Benforado, supra note 16, at 27 (providing statistics regarding the racial disparities in
these foundational areas).
392 See Lee, supra note 17, at 500 ("Efforts to minimize the influence of racial stereotypes,
especially if the costs of such efforts are low, can and should be made if we wish to remain true to our
ideals of fairness and equality.").
393 See Ellsworth, supra note 264, at 1390 ("When people are chosen to serve on a jury, they are
generally anxious to perform their task well, and eager for guidance on how to be a good jury.").
394 See Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 1226 ("[J]udges are overconfident about their ability to avoid
the influence of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all occasions.").
395 For a parallel effort to make even those who are not selected feel included, see Richard W.
Creswell, Georgia Courts in the 21st Century: The Report of the Supreme Court of Georgia Blue
Ribbon Commission on the Judiciary, 53 MERCER L. REv. 1, 20 (2001) ("[lIt is important that the jurors
be addressed in person by at least one judge during the time of their service. Since many jurors may
never leave the jury assembly room, the personal presence of a judge at the beginning of the process
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of implicit bias need not be seen as a distraction from substantive
inequalities, but rather as a crucial component of substantive inequality
that needs to be understood.397 Indeed, by including a public education
component, the proposal responds to the desire for cultural change that
leads many to view the implicit bias project as incomplete.398 Third, a
focus on implicit bias may help address other deficiencies within the
judicial system.39 9 If those arguing for stronger protections against the use
of prior convictions on cross-examination continue to make little headway,
they may wish to draw on the implicit bias research that indicates that
presenting more information about an individual-perhaps through that
individual's testimonya0 -- reduces both implicit and explicit bias relating
to that individual. 401  And while this proposal focuses on the implicit bias
of jurors, it may have effects on the implicit and explicit bias of judges and
attorneys that have the potential to address some of Batson's failings.40 2
It remains true, however, that there is no substitute for increased
diversity among jurors, an additional issue of substantive fairness that will
be addressed in the next subsection.
makes those jurors more willing to accept that their presence is, indeed, important to the court's ability
to administer justice.").
396 See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
397 See Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushbackfrom the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1139, 1147
(2010) (concluding that implicit biases "add an additional explanatory layer to the deepest
understanding of persistent inequalities among social groups"); Lawrence, supra note 27, at 965
(explaining that implicit bias research "is directed primarily at demonstrating the prevalence of forms
of bias that motivate and justify behavior that creates and perpetuates racial hierarchy and other
conditions of dominance and subordination").
398 See Lawrence, supra note 27, at 959 (stating that in his seminal earlier piece on unconscious
racism he "called attention to unconscious racism not so much to make the case that each of us as
individuals harbored unconscious racist thoughts as to make the case for the continued ubiquity of
racism in our culture"); Levinson, supra note 18, at 417-20 (proposing cultural change as the ultimate
goal in response to implicit bias findings).
9 See Kang, supra note 397, at 1139 ("Instead of trading off knowledge, for example, at the
cognitive layer for the sociological layer (or vice versa), we should seek understanding at each layer,
and then interpenetrate the entire stack."); id. at 1147 ("The deepest understanding of any process such
as racialization comes from multiple levels of analysis that can and should be integrated together.").
For an argument that tackling implicit bias may be essential to achieving broader structural reforms,
see Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REv 849,
907-08 (2010) ("[U]nless [cognitive] pathologies are accounted for and surmounted, the broader
structural reforms [that academics like Ralph Richard Banks, Richard Thompson Ford, and Olatunde
C.A. Johnson] seek... may never even get off the ground.").
400 See Arterton, supra note 4, at 1029 (describing her efforts as a judge to address racial bias
during voir dire, once she realized that if the African-American defendants did not testify the jurors
"would have no firsthand measure of the men on trial beyond their appearances").
401 See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 141, at 1114 ("[S]tereotype effects recede as people learn
more about each other as individuals, with individuating information often overwhelming stereotype
information.").
402 See supra Sections II.A.2-B.2.
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C. No Substitute for Juror Diversity
The lack of diversity within the jury, as within the ranks of judges and
attorneys, remains a problem that implicit bias initiatives do not solve.40 3
Increased awareness of implicit bias cannot change one's experiences, and
the notion that diversity of experience can increase the fairness of the jury
is well supported.4°
Yet extensive obstacles exist to juror diversity.40 5 Jury service is
financially and logistically impracticable for many.40 6 In addition, the
practice of drawing juror names from the voter rolls has a racially disparate
403 See Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution and
Wrongful Conviction in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 403, 408 (1994) ("It is misguided to believe that
White folks can discard strongly held negative attitudes about Blacks when Whites act as police, jurors,
lawyers, or judges in criminal cases with a Black criminal defendant."); Samuel R. Sommers, Race and
the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 181 (2007) ("[R]acially
diverse juries deliberated longer, discussed more trial evidence, and made fewer factually inaccurate
statements in discussing the evidence than did all-White juries. Interestingly, these effects, too, cannot
be explained solely in terms of the performance of Black jurors, as White jurors were more thorough
and accurate during deliberations on diverse vs. all-White juries. A potential implication of these
findings is that one process through which a diverse jury composition exerts its effects is by leading
White jurors to process evidence more thoroughly."); Ward, supra note 21, at 771 ("[R]acial apathy,
and its potential disadvantage to black crime victims, witnesses, jurors, or defendants, for example,
may be mitigated by black representation among decision makers, insofar as these court actors are
more likely to engage racial issues.").
404 See Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of Representative Juries, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
445, 449 (1994) (stating that jury impartiality is necessarily premised upon diversity of juror
backgrounds); Pamela R. Garfield, Comment, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.: Discrimination by Any
Other Name . . .. 72 DENV. U. L. REv 169, 180 (1994) ("[W]ithout the broad range of social
experiences often found in groups comprised of both sexes, juries may be ill-equipped to evaluate the
facts presented. For example, all male juries may not understand the fear and helplessness felt by
battered wives who, in self defense, wound or murder their batterers. Misunderstanding important
testimony relating to gender issues, such as spousal abuse, can create the opportunity for unconscious
prejudice.") (internal footnotes omitted); Race and the Criminal Jury, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1557, 1559
(1998) ("[T]he fact-finding ability of underrepresentative juries is impaired in a way that hurts minority
defendants. Without the broad range of social experiences that a group of diverse individuals can
provide, juries are often ill-equipped to evaluate the facts presented.").
405 See The Civil Jury: Jury Selection and Composition, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1443, 1456 (1997)
("Low juror fees and lack of support from employers further contribute to hardships for some potential
jurors.").
406 See Eveleth, supra note 309, at 44 (citing "[flamily and economic hardships brought on by jury
duty, and juror compensation" as big issues among jurors); Frequently Asked Questions, CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/jury/juryFAQ.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2011) (noting that in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City child and elder care are not available).
Proposals for measures to reduce or remove these constraints have generally been unsuccessful. See
Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury COLA: Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate Jurors Adequately, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 367 (2002) ("[M]ost [states] sidestep the issue of increasing fees
for the same reason as the ABA and the Congress, imagining the task to be overly difficult and
confusing."); Debra Duncan, Civil Litigation Section Creates County Juror Instruction Video,
LAWYERS J. (J. of Allegheny County Bar Ass'n, Pittsburgh, Pa.), Nov. 19, 2010, at 11 (citing claim
that juror pay in Pennsylvania has not changed in more than twenty-five years, and that "every year,
lawmakers introduce legislation to increase the fee, but the bills never seem to pass").
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impact,4 °7 as does the exclusion of those who have been involved with the
criminal justice system.40 8  As a series of racially disparate filters are
applied, the jury pool frequently loses all its color.40 9
For these reasons, even though implicit bias initiatives offer potential
that diversity does not,410 they should not overshadow the need for diverse
juries. And they need not; indeed, a focus on implicit bias can inform the
push for diverse juries, since one of the benefits of a diverse jury is that the
implicit bias of its members may be reduced.41 l
Thus, this proposal should not unduly concern those who worry about
the breadth of the influence of social science on law, or those who worry
about the narrowness of a focus on implicit bias as it affects jurors. It
must, however, be combined with continued efforts to diversify the jury,
and it can perhaps illuminate those efforts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The proposals to use the IAT to address jury bias are to be welcomed.
They take seriously the fact that decision-makers on whom life and liberty
depend have been shown to harbor pervasive racial bias-both explicit and
implicit. They raise awareness within the legal community of an area of
social science research that offers a way to expose some of that bias. Now
their potential must be realized-by careful winnowing away of those
ideas that are too ambitious, such as juror screening, and careful research
into the effectiveness of an educational model such as the model proposed
in this Article. The potential advantages justify the research, since they
offer the possibility of jurors who, while waiting to serve, no longer
languish in bored neglect, their civic enthusiasm ebbing away, but who are
instead welcomed into an interactive process, shown how difficult fairness
can be, and oriented into an active learning mindset that will maximize
407 See Kang et al., supra note 133, at 906-07.
408 See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 88
(2003).
409 See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 11, at 202 (noting that all-white juries are "not
uncommon," and "juries with a majority of White people are the rule").
410 Implicit biases are unlikely to "cancel each other out" in a diverse jury. See Wiley, supra note
129, at 231 ("[Counterbalancing] approaches fail ... when all people share the same overt or covert
bias."); Vedantam, supra note 158, at W12 ("Some 48 percent of blacks showed a pro-white or anti-
black bias [on the IAT]; 36 percent of Arab Muslims showed an anti-Muslim bias; and 38 percent of
gays and lesbians showed a bias for straight people over homosexuals.").
411 See Lee, supra note 17, at 465 ("Having more juries comprised of jurors with different
perspectives on the significance of race would probably educate jurors about racial bias more
effectively than limiting instructions."); Levinson, supra note 18, at 414 ("Studies have linked culture
and diversity to the reduction of implicit biases. These studies indicate that racially diverse juries, for
example, may make fewer cognitive errors than homogenous jurors, and that learning about or
experiencing diversity and multicultural ideologies in general can reduce implicit bias."); Race and the
Criminal Jury, supra note 404, at 1559.
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their satisfaction, their comprehension, and their performance.
